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JEDBURGH OPERATIONS:
SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH RESISTANCE IN CENTRAL FRANCE
FROM JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1944

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

By

MICHAEL R. KING, MAJOR, USA
B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

JEDBURGH OPERATIONS: SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH RESISTANCE IN CENTRAL FRANCE FROM JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1944 by Major Michael R. King, USA, 149 pages.

This study is a historical narrative of Jedburgh teams Hugh, Hamish, Ian, Andy, Ivor, and Alec, which operated in Central France from June through September 1944. The teams consisted of two officers, one French and the other American or British, and one non-commissioned officer wireless telegraphy (radio) operator. Jedburghs, as the team members were called, were all volunteers and specially trained soldiers in the art of guerrilla warfare. Their purpose was to support the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) during its campaign to liberate northwestern Europe, beginning with operation OVERLORD in France.

This study explains the origins, purpose, and missions/tasks of the Jedburgh project. The focus of this study, however, is of the actual operations of six Jedburgh teams. I documented the activities of these teams in order to recount their achievements and analyze their effectiveness. As will be seen, five of the six Jedburgh teams were effective. Additionally, a review of the Jedburgh operations validates current Special Forces doctrine as it relates to unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance.



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PREFACE

Unconventional warfare is as old as warfare itself. Jedburgh teams employed the art of unconventional warfare successfully against the German Army in France in 1944. Although the Jedburgh missions took place 47 years ago, the analysis of their activity provides one the opportunity to view the conduct of unconventional warfare in the modern age of mechanized forces, radios, and aircraft.

Most special operations that conduct unconventional warfare are classified, thus restricting any analysis to only a few select personnel. Since the Jedburgh war diary was declassified in the late 1970's, their exploits are now available to study. Jedburgh operations provides one the few opportunities to view unconventional warfare without the filters of security constraints and popular mythmaking.

I am dedicating this study to two American Jedburghs killed during their missions: First Sergeant Lewis Goddard of team Ivor and Sergeant Lucien Bourgoin of team Ian.

I would like to thank Major Leon "Butch" Baker and Dr. S.J. Lewis, my thesis committee, for their support, assistance, and encouragement. I consider it my good fortune to have met Dr. Lewis early in my CGSC tour, for he was responsible for introducing me to the "Jedburghs". My thanks to Mrs. Daphne Friele for sharing her personal knowledge of the Jedburghs and Mrs. Helen Davis of the Graduate Degree Program Office for her assistance in mailing letters to the surviving Jedburghs. I would like to recognize the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth for their professional assistance and performance in maintaining that wonderful storehouse of knowledge.

I would like to give my special thank you to Mr. Glyn Loosmore, "Sergeant Loosmore" of teams Andy and Ivor, Mr. Alexandre Desfarges, "Lieutenant Delorme" of team Ian, and Mr. Rene de la Tousche, "Lieutenant Thouville" of team Alexander for the invaluable information they so graciously provided. Their letters and photographs provided a unique understanding of Jedburgh operations.

Finally, I wish to recognize the great sacrifice my family made while I turned "family time" into "Jedburgh time". Their support was unwavering and enabled me to complete this tasks. I love you all very much. To my wife Kathleen, and my children Alisha, Joshua, and Brianna, thank you for your support.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will document and assess the operations of six Jedburgh teams operating in central France during the summer of 1944. Although World War II is best known for its large scale conventional military campaigns involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, aviators, and marines, there was a significant effort by a relatively few bold individuals to defeat the enemy via covert means. The Jedburghs were part of the covert war employed by the Western Allies.

"JEDBURGHs"

Jedburghs were specially trained three-man teams, consisting of two officers and a radio operator, destined to parachute behind enemy lines in France, Belgium, and Holland during the liberation of northwestern Europe. One of the officers was a native of the country to which the team deployed, while the other was an American or British officer. Jedburghs were soldiers and normally wore their uniforms when deployed behind enemy lines. The Jedburghs would establish contact with resistance groups and support these

groups with communications, supplies, and leadership, thus linking the resistance groups with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).¹

The term "Jedburgh" was the name of a project, which envisioned using Allied soldiers to assist the resistance forces in Nazi occupied Europe. The head of British Special Operations Executive (SOE) London Group, Major General C. McV. Gubbins, described the concept on 6 July 1942 in a note to the Chief of the SOE Security section stating:

A project is under consideration for the dropping behind of the enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication. These men are to be recruited and trained by SOE. It is requested that "Jumpers" or some other appropriate code name be allotted to this personnel.²

On 7 July 1942 the Chief of SOE Security provided the code name "Jedburghs" to this project.³

The American and British chiefs of staff formed an agreement in September 1942, which basically consolidated the British and American efforts to support the resistance forces in northwestern Europe. This joined the American Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) special operations (SO) London office with the London Group of SOE to coordinate this joint effort. SOE/SO, as it was known, became the joint headquarters. The recruiting of Jedburgh volunteers however,

followed separate lines, with the British recruiting from the British armed forces and the Americans recruiting from the American military.*

Serious planning for Jedburgh operations did not begin until early 1943, when the necessary staff coordination proposals between SOE, OSS and the Chief of Staff for the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), began. The purpose of this staff coordination was to receive the COSSAC'S approval to conduct behind the line operations with resistance forces in conjunction with the invasion of France. Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan, COSSAC, approved the SOE proposals on 19 July 1943. He then reported to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and stated:

I have discussed with SOE their proposals for establishing shortly before D-day:

a. Small SOE staffs and Signal Sections at Headquarters of Armies, and SOE representatives at Headquarters of Army Groups and of the Supreme Commander, for controlling resistance groups.

b. Reserve teams of personnel (JEDBURGHS) to be kept in this country for use after D-day, to provide, if necessary, suitable leadership and equipment for those resistance groups found to be in need of them.

I have agreed in principle to these proposals, and request that the Chiefs of Staff instruct the War Office to prepare the detailed establishments and arrange, at the appropriate time, for the transfer to SOE of any personnel necessary.*

The British Chiefs of Staff Committee approved General Morgan's request for establishing and manning the Jedburgh project.*

Major General R.W. Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, indorsed the OSS proposals and forwarded them to Lieutenant General J.L. Devers, U.S. Theater Commander, who approved the proposals on 24 August 1943. The OSS proposals were very similar to the SOE proposals. They included having personnel on the staffs of U.S. armies to coordinate and control, through SOE/SO, resistance groups' activities and the establishment and manning of the project.⁷

Nine months before the invasion of France and operation OVERLORD, the Jedburgh project had much work ahead of it. In addition to planning, the recruitment and training of personnel had to be done. By the end of November 1943, the OSS recruiting efforts were largely completed for the European Theater. The recruiting process took place through the Army's Adjutant General's Office. The initial results produced 55 Jedburgh officer volunteers, many from the Airborne Command; 62 Jedburgh radio operator volunteers, from the Army Signal Schools in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Camp Crowder, Missouri; and 54 Army staff officers, selected to fill the special forces detachments scheduled to assist the army headquarters.⁸

The American Jedburgh officer and radio operator volunteers arrived in the United Kingdom in late December 1943. The officers underwent an assessment process to determine their suitability for the project. Thirty seven

officers qualified to continue the project and were sent to Scotland for their initial training. The radio operator volunteers started their training at a communications school in the United Kingdom. After one month of wireless telegraphy (W/T) training, 46 radio operators remained. On 5 February 1944 the officers and radio operators converged at their new training facility, Milton Hall, where all of the Jedburghs trained together. Milton Hall lies four miles north of Peterborough, England, approximately 60 miles north of London. As of February 1944, Milton Hall became the home of the Jedburghs."

The Jedburgh project planned to recruit and train approximately 300 personnel to man the operational teams. The United States and Great Britain each provided an equal number of officers, approximately 50 each. France, Belgium and Holland supplied one officer per team targeted in those countries. The United States and Great Britain closely split up the requirements for the W/T enlisted men, about 50 each. In addition to the operational teams, support staffs required close to 260 officers and men. These personnel would man the SOE/SO headquarters in London and the special forces detachments assigned to the field armies.¹⁰

The Jedburgh project was a "start from scratch" operation. Although the concept was initiated in mid 1942, serious development of the organization, which would enact the concept, did not begin until late 1943 with the

recruiting initiative. The Jedburgh team's training did not begin until January 1944, just six months prior to OVERLORD. The purpose of the recruiting and training was, according to the Basic Jedburgh Directive of 20 December 1943, to field Jedburgh teams that would:

...provide a strategic reserve for creating and controlling offensive action behind the enemy lines on and after D-day where existing communications, leadership, organization, or supplies are inadequate, and for carrying out additional specific tasks demanded by the military situation.¹¹

Given the short amount of time to get the Jedburgh project off the ground, it is remarkable that this special operations initiative succeeded in dispatching qualified teams. In all, approximately 93 Jedburgh missions dropped into France during the summer and fall of 1944. Twenty-one Jedburghs died during these missions.¹²

Jedburgh missions encompassed a wide variety of tasks, which ranged from organizing, equipping, and training resistance groups in guerrilla warfare, to providing a communication link between resistance groups and the Supreme Allied Commander. The objective of employing the Jedburgh project however, was to reduce the German's combat effectiveness in northwestern Europe. Examples of Jedburgh tasks from the Basic Jedburgh Directive of 20 December 1943 included:

Rail cutting; attacks on enemy road vehicles, including transport parks; misdirecting, delaying and dislocating Panzer Division movements; destruction of telecommunications; liquidation of enemy commands and staff, through attacks of staff

cars, small administrative detachments, and rear installations; interference with enemy supplies (military depot only); sabotage of enemy aircraft, attacks on planes, supplies and pilots off duty; destruction of electric power points used for military purposes; demolition of minor bridges, or premature demolition of major bridges already prepared by the enemy; preservation of vital points for later use by Allied armies; attacks on railway installations; attacks on locomotives and rolling stock, without causing lasting damage.¹³

There were several types of targets that the Jedburghs were not to attack: industrial facilities, public utility installations (other than those used for military purposes), shipping, and major bridges not already prepared for demolition by the enemy. The Jedburghs were not primarily intelligence agents, but would report intelligence information they observed in the course of their mission. Simply put, Jedburghs were strategic assets, trained as a "jack-of-all-trades" team, and employed against tactical targets.¹⁴

The Jedburgh's command and control in January 1944 was quite simple. As a strategic asset, there was little overhead between the Jedburgh team in the field and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The "overhead" simply being the SOE/SO London Group headquarters, which later changed names to Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) on 1 May 1944. The name change provided better operational security and better relations between SFHQ and the more conventional forces of the military.¹⁵

By July 1944, the liberation of France was in progress. Control of most of the resistance forces in France shifted from SFHQ to the Etat-major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (EMFFI). General Koenig, a personal friend and supporter of De Gaulle, commanded the EMFFI. This change of control technically placed the Jedburgh teams under control of the EMFFI, but in reality the Jedburgh teams continued to operate on behalf of SFHQ, which provided the resources for EMFFI to function.^{1*}

"BACKGROUND OF THESIS"

The purpose of this thesis is to present a historical account of six Jedburgh teams, Hugh, Hamish, Ian, Andy, Ivor, and Alec. The activities of the Jedburgh teams have only recently been made available to the public through declassified official war reports. Prior to the late 1970s, most of the specific actions of the teams remained classified. The declassified official war reports provide a unique primary source of information, which greatly helped in understanding the specific missions and tasks of each team. Also, the reports provide a first hand account by team members of their efforts. I relied extensively on the material in these official Jedburgh war reports. Additionally, through correspondence with several of the team members, I received valuable information which expanded the scope of those reports.

The research question answered in this thesis is:
"How effective were the six Jedburgh teams at accomplishing their mission/tasks?" I used one criteria to measure effectiveness, which was, did the Jedburgh team accomplish what SFHQ instructed the team to do? I compared what the teams reported to have accomplished to what SFHQ expected of the teams. If the Jedburgh team accomplished what SFHQ ordered the team to complete, I determined the team to be effective. If the team failed to accomplish what SFHQ expected of the team, I determined the team to be ineffective.

During the comparison process however, some tasks levied by SFHQ could not be performed. Since the activity SFHQ tasked was already complete, the Jedburgh team was unable to fulfill SFHQ's tasking. In those cases I chose to disregard that particular task. In short, if the team was unable to complete a task because of circumstances beyond the team's control, I did not consider the task in determining the team's effectiveness.

Although I note enemy killed and captured, equipment destroyed, and convoys disrupted, I did not consider these results in determining effectiveness. There is very little substantive information with which to determine how effective the Jedburghs were at engaging the enemy. Most of the information I researched provided a one-sided view. There

were no un-biased reporters covering the covert war raging behind the lines in France during 1944 to objectively report on how each side did.

In reading this thesis, one will recognize that the six Jedburgh teams studied were generally effective at accomplishing the mission and tasks assigned to them. This is because the original concept of the Jedburgh project presented such a broad range of tasks, that the mission and tasks assigned the six teams, as well as what they actually did, easily addressed and satisfied the original concept of the project.

"SITUATION IN FRANCE"

Hitler's Nazi war machine quickly overran and defeated the French Third Republic during May and June of 1940. This defeat was a tremendous blow to the French people, who were subsequently subject to the influence of Hitler and his Third Reich.

Hitler offered France an armistice in June, 1940 that provided for a government by Frenchmen; this government was referred to as the Vichy government. In effect, Hitler let the French govern themselves, but there was a great deal of influence from the various German party or government agencies. The German Army of occupation was initially restricted to the area of the Atlantic coast and the northern regions of the country, basically three-fifths of France. On

11 November 1942. Hitler ordered his troops to cross the demarcation line and occupy the remaining two-fifths of France because of the successes of the Anglo-American landing in North Africa.¹⁷

Organized resistance to the Vichy government during the first year was almost nonexistent. Resistance did not occur initially because of the hopeless situation many Frenchmen experienced due to their defeat; the wait-and-see attitude towards the Vichy government; and the general chaos of national defeat by an ancient foe. There was also a segment of the French public that willingly supported the right-wing traditionalist and authoritarian politicians of the Vichy government.¹⁸

French resistance towards the Vichy government and the Germans began to develop in 1941. Some significant events which initiated this change were Germany's invasion of Russia in June 1941, Hitler's failure to defeat Great Britain, and the support rendered by the United States to Great Britain. Specifically, it was French communism that mobilized a solid block of Frenchmen against the Vichy government and Hitler, because of Germany's attack on communist Russia. Additionally, the success of Operation TORCH (Anglo-American landings in North Africa), which resulted in the Allied occupation of French colonies, kindled French hopes for their own liberation. By 1944 most

Frenchmen understood the situation their country was in and made a decision to support the resistance movement or the Vichy government, with its links to Germany.¹⁰

The final German inspired Vichy government act that drove most Frenchmen towards the resistance was the forced labor draft in 1943/44. The purpose of this draft was to place young Frenchmen in German factories to fill the shortage of German manpower. It led to a massive flight of young Frenchmen to the mountains and forests of central and southern France to escape this slave labor policy.¹⁰

"AREA OF OPERATIONS"

The six Jedburgh teams considered here operated in four French departments, Charente, Vienne, Indre, and the Cher. These departments are located approximately 150 miles south of Paris and south of the extensive Loire River. The major cities of these departments are Angouleme in the Charente department; Poitiers in the Vienne department; Chateauroux in the Indre department; and Bourges in the Cher department. [map page 17]

The Charente department is 2,298 square miles in area and is primarily rural. Agriculture is extensive with wheat, corn and fodder crops being grown along with vineyards, for wine making. There was limited industry in the form of paper-works and food canning in Angouleme.¹¹

The Vienne department is 2,699 square miles in area and is essentially rural, with abundant forests and woodlands. Vegetables, fodder crops, fruit, and cereals are the primary cultivated plants. Aside from Poitiers, Chatellerault is the other town in the department of any size. The smaller towns throughout the department serve primarily as agricultural markets.²²

The Indre department is 2,617 square miles in area and also rural, with an agricultural region in the northeast. The southern part of the department is hilly and wooded, the woods extend through the central and into the northern part of the department. The western region of the Indre, known as the Brenne, is marshy and covered with many small lakes. The limited industry in the department is localized, mostly in the Chateauroux area.²³

The Cher department is 2,793 square miles in area and rural in nature with woodlands in the north and western regions. Agriculture is widespread throughout the department and consists of wheat farming, bee keeping, cattle raising, and viticulture. Sergeant Loosmore, of Jedburgh team(s) Andy and Ivor, recalled the Cher as being fairly flat with many woods, forests and huge fields. He also observed that the main roads were fairly straight, but the side roads wound between hedges, making the region ideal for ambushes.²⁴

The four departments in which the Jedburgh teams operated appeared to be quite suitable for guerrilla

operations. Being mostly rural, wooded, and primarily agricultural; the Jedburghs and resistance forces made good use of this terrain to hide and maneuver against the enemy. According to Sergeant Loosmore, resistance forces lived in the farm buildings and forest shelters in the Cher department. It is very likely the resistance forces conducted themselves similarly in the other departments.™

"THE ENEMY"

Since the Jedburgh teams operated to the rear of the German main combat forces, they rarely encountered conventional German forces. Instead, the Jedburgh's main threat came from the German rear area security forces, elements of the German 64th Corps, and the Milice, which were counterinsurgency forces of the Vichy government. The ranks of the Milice came from those Frenchmen that supported the Vichy government and opposed the "terrorists" (the term the Germans and Vichy government attributed to the resistance forces). Elements of the German 64th Corps became a threat, as well as the primary target, of the Jedburghs and resistance forces when the corps began its withdrawal from southwestern France. Although the French police occasionally posed a threat to the Jedburghs and resistance, most of the time the police ignored or actually assisted the resistance forces.™

The German rear area security apparatus in the Charente, Vienne, Indre, and Cher departments was typical of the German military government of France. Accordingly, each French department quartered a German Feldkommandantur or Verbindungsstab headquarters. Generally, the Feldkommandantur headquarters were found in occupied France, while the Verbindungsstab headquarters were found in unoccupied, or Vichy France. No significant difference in manning or purpose existed between these headquarters. These headquarters were basically a military administration organization consisting of approximately 2,000 personnel and usually commanded by a colonel or brigadier general. These units were responsible for maintaining order, protecting lines of communications, guarding supply and equipment dumps, and additional duties as assigned in their department. Feldkommandantur 887 headquarters was in Angouleme, Charente department. Feldkommandantur 677 headquarters was in Poitiers, Vienne department. Verbindungsstabe 990 headquarters was in Chateauroux, Indre department. Feldkommandantur 776 headquarters was in Bourges, Cher department.*7

Elements of the 64th German Corps became the main target of the Jedburghs and resistance forces in August 1944. Accordingly, this German unit presented the greatest challenge to the existence of the resistance as it withdrew

through the Charente, Vienne, Indre, and Cher departments during August and early September 1944.

Somewhere between 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen participated in the withdrawal of the 64th corps. These units left southwestern France in mid August with the intent of linking up with the 19th German Army near Dijon, France. Only two infantry divisions were part of the withdrawal, the 159th and the 16th. Most of the combat power had been earlier diverted to Normandy, thus the 64th corps was not a typical front line combat unit. For example, the 159th Infantry Division was poorly trained, lacked all types of heavy weapons, and certain supplies, according to its commander. In effect, the 64th corps was an ad-hoc grouping of various units to conduct a withdrawal."

When the 64th corps entered the Vienne department, the corps moved in three march groups. These groups were reorganized in the Poitiers area to accommodate Army Group G's desire to evacuate the combat units first. In late August 1944 three new groups formed, the first being a motorized group consisting of 24,000 personnel primarily from the 159th Infantry Division. The second march group consisted of 6,000 bicycle mobile personnel. The third group, commanded by General Elster, consisted of approximately 18,000 foot mobile personnel. This last group included about 6,000 personnel each from the army, navy, and Luftwaffe."



Map 1. French departments

Departments

- # 16 Charente
- # 18 Cher
- # 23 Creuse
- # 36 Indre
- # 37 Indre-et-Loire
- # 41 Loir-et-Cher
- # 86 Vienne
- # 87 Haute-Vienne

Jedburgh team

- Ian
- Ivor, Alec
- Hugh, Hamish, Andy
- Ian

CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 3: 11.

• Ibid., 1.

• Ibid., 1.

⁴ M.R.D. Foot, SOE In France An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-44 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969), 31.

• Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: xiv.

• Ibid., xiii, xiv.

⁷ Ibid., xiv, xv; R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 28. The OSS was made up of two branches, the Secret Intelligence Branch (SI) and the Special Operations Branch (SO). The SI branch worked primarily with espionage, the secret collection of intelligence related information. The SO branch worked primarily with sabotage and liaison with resistance or underground movements.

• Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: xx,xxi.

• Ibid., xxii,xxiii, 11; Glyn Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991. The British radio operators underwent morse and code training at Henly-on-Thames. Part of the operators eventually moved to Dunbar, Scotland to practice transmitting with those at Henly-on-Thames. Apparently the Jedburgh radio did not work well over short distances.

¹⁰ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: xiii, xvi.

¹¹ Ibid., 11.

¹³ Ibid., 39,242. Some Jedburgh teams deployed more than once. Team George participated in two missions to France, the fourth and 56th Jedburgh missions. Six teams dropped into Holland. In all, approximately 99 Jedburgh missions took place in France and Holland; Foot, SOE In France, 33,34.

¹⁴ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: v.

¹⁵ Ibid., iv.

¹⁶ Foot, SOE In France, 32,37,38.

¹⁷ Ibid., 385,33.

¹⁸ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 5: xi.

¹⁹ Ibid., xi.

²⁰ Ibid., xi.

²¹ Ibid., xii,xiii.

²² Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Charente."

²³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Vienne."

²⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Indre."

²⁵ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Cher."; Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991.

²⁶ Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991.

²⁷ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 5: xiii; S.J. Lewis, "Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944", draft ms., Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 18-20.

²⁸ Lewis, "Jedburgh Team Operations", 18-20; "German Military Government of France 1944", unpublished document from the holdings of Dr. S.J. Lewis, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 1-7.

²⁹ Friedrich Dernen, "159th Infantry Division 1939 - 15 September 1944", B-530: 3; Kuit Schuster, "The LXIV Army Corps in the Period from August to November, 1944", A-885: 4. Approximately 100,000 Germans, including 2,000 women, fell under the control of the 64th Corps in early August 1944. Not

all of the Germans evacuated southwestern France. Some stayed to defend the "fortress" areas of La Rochelle and the mouth of the Gironde River.

•• Gustav Seiz, "Withdrawal of Rear Guard, 159th From Bordeaux to Poitiers", B-423: 3.

CHAPTER TWO

TEAM HUGH

Team Hugh had the distinction of being the first Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom. Hugh received this distinction as they parachuted into the Indre department of Central France during the early morning hours of 6 June 1944 - the beginning of Operation OVERLORD. The team included one British officer, Captain (Sir) William Crawshay, and two Frenchmen, Captain Louis L'Helgouach and Sub-Lieutenant Rene Meyer. Captain Crawshay led the team while Sub-Lieutenant Meyer was the team's wireless telegraphy (W/T) operator. Team Hugh would spend the next three and one-half months successfully operating behind enemy lines before they returned to Great Britain.¹

The mission assigned team Hugh consisted of several tasks, which included contacting agent "Samuel" (head of F-section's SHIPWRIGHT circuit), organizing small resistance groups, reporting to Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) the state of the resistance forces to include potential, personnel, leadership, and arms, and coordinating with agent "Samuel" on the suitability of meeting other resistance groups. The Jedburghs were to assist the British Special Air

Service (SAS) team "Bullbasket" advance party to establish a base of operations for follow-on SAS forces as well as provide communications for the advance party."

Although SFHQ initially instructed team Hugh to avoid organizing any large groups of resistance in team Hugh's area, the task of avoiding large groups proved to be very difficult, as membership in the resistance swelled with the advent of Operation OVERLORD. As will be seen, team Hugh did more than assist SAS team "Bullbasket" and report on the status of the resistance. They organized, trained, supplied, and coordinated the resistance's actions with the requirements of SFHQ."

Following their briefing, team Hugh boarded an aircraft, along with two SAS officers of team "Bullbasket", late on the night of 5 June. The quantity of equipment and containers filled the aircraft to capacity, thus, cramping the paratroopers and making for an uncomfortable flight. During the two hour and forty minutes it took to fly from the safety of Great Britain into the hazardous interior of France, the aircraft encountered some flak when crossing the French coastline, but sustained no damage. At 0140 hours on 6 June the two SAS officers jumped first followed by Captain Crawshay, Captain L'Helgouach, and Sub-Lieutenant Meyer. The drop zone, established by agent "Olive" (one of "Samuel's sub-agents, who would be killed by the enemy near Eguzon the following night) and four assistants, proved to be barely

adequate for the jump. The team members narrowly missed landing in woods, while the impact of landing destroyed one rucksack's contents. The equipment containers were spread over two kilometers, which further complicated the recovery of this precious material.*

Team Hugh's area of operations centered on the town of Chateauroux in the Indre department. Two major transportation networks, rail and road, ran north and south through the team's area. Chateauroux served as a hub for several major highways, and one railroad line, all running generally north and south. The natural line of communication for road and rail followed Limoges - Chateauroux - Orleans. About 50 miles west of Chateauroux lies the town of Poitiers, which is part of another (more important) north and south rail and road network. This transportation network's natural line of communication runs from Bordeaux - Poitiers - Tours. [map page 37] These transportation networks would prove to be important withdrawal routes for the German 64th Corps as it departed southwestern France. Team Hugh and the resistance would dedicate the majority of their efforts to hinder the German's use of these transportation networks.*

Later in the morning of 6 June, the Jedburghs announced their successful infiltration to SFHQ via the team's W/T. Team Hugh was so busy their first five days in France that they slept little. Many of their duties required inspecting Maquis groups throughout the department. So much

travelling took a considerable time because of the precautions team Hugh followed, since they were behind enemy lines. The three Jedburghs encountered the enemy on numerous occasions. For example, in one situation the Germans shot and killed a resistance liaison officer as he was leaving a cafe. Captain Crawshay, who was still inside the cafe, escaped out of a rear exit."

Team Hugh assessed the various resistance organizations they encountered. They also arranged and supervised the reception committee for SAS team "Bullbasket" on the nights of 8 and 9 June and assisted the SAS in establishing their base of operation near Lussac-les-Chateaux (the closest, yet safest area for interdicting their target). On the night of 12/13 June team Hugh established the reception site for Jedburgh team Hamish. The team also identified drop zones for future use and organized the various resistance groups."

On the afternoon of 6 June, team Hugh met with agent "Samuel" and Chief of the Armee Secrete of Indre, "Surcouf", to coordinate a suitable base of operations for SAS team "Bullbasket". As a result of this meeting, the SAS officer in charge accepted the task to concentrate his efforts to interdict the rail line running through Poitiers (Bordeaux - Poitiers - Tours). Primary factors considered for the employment of the SAS were, keeping team integrity, recognizing this line of communication as the more difficult

target and more important than Chateauroux, and knowing the resistance around Chateauroux appeared better organized and capable of keeping that rail line blocked. The coordination completed, SAS team "Bullbasket" married up with a resistance group, which maintained contact with agent "Samuel", near Lussac-les-Chateaux on the evening of 9 June.*

With team Hugh's first task completed, the team concentrated on another, reporting on the status of the resistance. This task rapidly evolved into the original idea for which the Jedburghs were created - organize, supply, train, and employ resistance forces behind enemy lines.*

It took three weeks for team Hugh to effectively organize the separate resistance groups in the Indre department. However, during a two day conference, on 25/26 June, with all the various resistance leaders, the Jedburghs facilitated the establishment of a resistance framework with which to engage the enemy. The Jedburghs became the conduit by which the Etat-major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (EMFFI)¹⁰ directed the various resistance groups in the Indre department. As the Allied representatives in the Indre department, team Hugh was in a position to bring the groups together.¹¹

By mid-June the Jedburghs could account for approximately 3,000 Maquis in the Indre department. About half were armed. These forces fell into three groups; company and battalion size forces comprising the mobile forces of the

Maquis; static elements under the control of numerous section chiefs; and individuals who maintained their normal employment, yet concealed weapons near their homes for activation when necessary.¹²

Team Hugh's intense during this organization and build-up period. The Jedburghs believed the potential for large scale resistance organization was great because of the numbers and enthusiasm of the resistance forces they met. Hugh's request for more Jedburgh teams from SFHQ to assist in organizing the Indre department initially produced team Hamish. More would arrive later. In the mean time, team Hamish, F section's WRESTLER circuit, and service d'atterrissages et parachutages (SAP), an RF section's affiliate, assisted Hugh. Specifically, they contributed to numerous parachute operations which brought in much needed weapons and supplies. The presence of the Jedburghs and their ability to request and receive arms and equipment for the Maquis significantly enhanced the Maquis' growth and effectiveness. Team Hugh reported 500 rail cuts between 6 June and 6 July to SFHQ. Due to the Jedburghs training, rail cuts became more effective and economical.¹³

By early August, team Hugh's organizational effort provided tangible results. Their area of operations increased to accommodate the growing resistance forces, which numbered approximately 9,000. As a result of this growth, team Hugh became the delegue militaire (military delegate, and

as such a leader in the resistance) of the region of the departments of Indre and Indre et Loire in early August. This expanded Hugh's command and control problem, but provided for the coordination of all resistance efforts in the area. The team's 4 August message to SFHQ stated: "We already have more work than we can handle comfortably."¹⁴ Jedburgh teams Julian and Ivor parachuted into France on 6 and 11 August respectively to assist team Hugh.¹⁵

SFHQ voiced its concern in several of its initial messages to Hugh over the rapid growth of the resistance forces reported by Hugh. SFHQ believed that an overly rapid growth would cause problems with agents, an inability to sustain a large force, and maneuver. Infiltration by a German agent or sympathizer could jeopardize the entire resistance organization and the Jedburghs. SFHQ was well aware of SOE F circuits destroyed by German penetration. Resupply of the Maquis could pose problems because of a lack of aircraft, equipment, or priority. A 7 August message from SFHQ to team Hugh stated: "we are working on your supply requirements but you must realize present great demands from circuits near Brittany and Normandy."¹⁶ Finally, hiding and moving a large number of Maquis posed a problem in itself because of the terrain.¹⁷

Team Hugh soon encountered a more pressing problem when they were nearly caught in a German pursuit of Vienne resistance forces. On 3 July an SS infantry battalion

attacked SAS team "Bullbasket" and their resistance forces in the Vienne department. The attack devastated "Bullbasket". Trapped, a third of "Bullbasket" were captured and shot, the rest eventually exfiltrated via a SOE network. The resistance forces fled the Vienne department into the Indre department.^{1*}

Around mid-day on 10 July the team evacuated their headquarters because of a German threat brought on by the resistance forces. Earlier that day the Germans attacked two Maquis companies hiding in the woods of Luzeraize and Souvigny, just east of Belabre. [map page 38] These were the two unfortunate companies that had fled the Vienne department earlier in the month. Team Hugh speculated that poor Maquis security procedures allowed the Germans to pursue the two Maquis companies, thus compromising Hugh's headquarters. The Germans eventually broke off the pursuit, while team Hugh and the resistance withdrew north towards the Brenne.^{1*}

Team Hugh believed that the German attack on the resistance and SAS team "Bullbasket" in Vienne resulted in part because of "Bullbasket's" method of operating. The appearance of uniformed British SAS driving about the countryside in jeeps, and attacking their forces was too much for the Germans. The Germans successfully attacked the SAS

team. Team Hugh criticized the SAS operation stating:

This attack was mainly due to the lack of security shown by the SAS who even at that early stage paraded about the countryside in jeeps."^o

Prior to the German's attack on "Bullbasket" and the Vienne resistance, Hugh could move about the department and conduct their reconnaissance, resupply drops, and organizational duties without meeting any large scale German resistance. Although the Germans maintained continuous pressure on the Maquis, it was not enough to preclude the Jedburghs, using certain precautions, to get out and travel."¹

Towards the end of July, after having consolidated the scattered resistance forces and reduced resistance attacks against the Germans, team Hugh's resistance forces increased their offensive tempo. Prime targets for the resistance became small German convoys, which took no precaution against the Maquis. As the Maquis's success rate went up, the Germans began taking more precaution by moving in large convoys. However, identification of these convoys by Hugh led to aerial bombing by the Allies, which according to team Hugh proved to be effective."²

August proved to be the time for increased activity by the Maquis and their supporting Jedburghs. SFHQ passed Hugh activation code messages on 26 July, forewarning Hugh to prepare the Maquis for increased activity and listen for the messages. The wait was not long, for the British

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) began broadcasting the activation messages in August and the Maquis responded with a great number of local actions. The messages were keyed to specific targets for destruction: first, railways - "Une Femme fagotte"; second, telephones - "Ne folatrez pas le matin"; third, roads - "Quasimodo est une fete"; fourth, intensive guerrilla activity but not open warfare "Le Xeres est un vin d'Espagne". However, in Indre department, the railways had long been immobilized by resistance sabotage and air attacks, so they focused on other activities."³

Being ever astute to what went on their region, Hugh found out that the Germans intended to destroy the electric power station at Eguzon. This was a very important source of hydroelectric power in France and would not be easily repaired. The Maquis immediately isolated the area, but was unable to dislodge a heavily armed German force occupying the facility. Thus, team Hugh requested an airborne unit be dispatched to assist the team in driving out the Germans and securing the facility. SFHQ responded by sending American Operations Group (OG) Patrick. The Germans soon withdrew without damaging the plant, which the Maquis then occupied."⁴

On 18 August 1944 the 64th German Corps received orders from Army Group G to evacuate southwestern France. Prior to this the 64th Corps had relocated its headquarters from Bordeaux to Poitiers on 10 August. This set in motion the movement of thousands of troops and their equipment

towards team Hugh's area. The major routes of withdrawal led through Tours, thus skirting the Indre department. One of the primary routes ran through Poitiers (Vienne department), just west of Indre department. Another ran from Tours eastward to Orleans, just north of the Indre department. However, with the U.S. Third Army stretched along the Loire River, the Tours route became more dangerous. Also, the Germans sought alternate routes to expand their withdrawal zone and minimize damage from air attacks. These routes began to cross the Indre as the Germans began avoiding the northern areas, away from the American presence north of the Loire River.**

Team Hugh's success in organizing and supplying the Maquis partially resulted from the German's lack of interest in the Indre. The Germans up to mid August were apparently satisfied with their existing lines of communications. As such, the Germans did not direct much attention to the department, which allowed the Maquis to develop.**

Team Hugh estimated that in late August the Germans had between 60,000 and 100,000 troops yet to pass around or eventually through the Indre area during their withdrawal. This in mind, Hugh implemented a two part strategy to attack and disrupt the German movements. The first objective was to interdict all routes of withdrawal in and around the department. Interdicting these routes would force the enemy

to travel in large convoys along fewer routes, but would increase their vulnerability to air attacks the Jedburghs would request. Secondly, since one of the German major routes ran just north of the department, team Hugh coordinated the movement of several Maquis units north to attack the enemy. The team had at its disposal about 6,000 armed Maquis divided into twelve battalions and several smaller groups.²⁷

With the tactical plan in place, Captain Crawshay flew back to London to coordinate this final operation with SFHQ. His exfiltration and subsequent infiltration took place via an SFHQ sponsored aircraft (Dakota operation).²⁸ In London Captain Crawshay discussed the following issues with SFHQ: the disposition of his forces and their targeted areas, a need for more bombing missions dedicated to the Indre department, a quicker response time for those missions, and the need for an American force to enter the department and support the tactical plan. An American column did not arrive; their combat remained north of the Loire River. Allied air strikes continued, but not frequently enough, according to team Hugh, to hit targets located by the team.²⁹

Captain Crawshay returned to the team around 4 September after arriving in Limoges via a Dakota operation. By 10 September the Germans were essentially gone from the Indre department. Team Hugh reported to SFHQ on 10 September that the Indre and attached areas of Indre et Loire were

entirely liberated. After completing a few weeks of liaison with Allied Forces in the region, team Hugh departed France and returned to England around 23 September 1944.²⁰

"TEAM HUGH - CONCLUSION"

In all, team Hugh faired very well and accomplished all of its assigned tasks. Being the first team to infiltrate from England, team Hugh had more time than most other Jedburgh teams to develop its region. Another factor that helped the team organize and sustain the resistance was the relative lack of German interest in the Indre department. However, once the massive German withdrawal began and spilled into Hugh's department, Hugh was able to employ a sizable and well-equipped force of some 9,000 Maquis. The Maquis hindered the movement of German forces that were desperately trying to avoid being encircled by the Western Allies. This impediment caused delays, and the loss of men and equipment. According to a German staff officer from the 84th German Corps:

The entire operation was noticeably delayed by the fact that a march through the area of Montlucon - Limoges - Chateauroux, which would have meant a notable short-cut, and consequent saving of time - was rendered impossible by territorial obstacles and the activities of the French resistance movement, becoming more lively just then and furnished now with arms by the Allies. All movement therefore had to be carried out with Poitiers as its pivot, with the troops passing through Bourges and Nevers.²¹

It is difficult to quantify the damage inflicted on the Germans by Jedburgh operations. The difficulty lies in the nature of the Jedburghs mission, which was guerrilla warfare. As such, there were no forward line of operations, objectives to seize, or areas to hold. Guerrilla warfare produces great uncertainty for the occupying power, the Germans in this case. The Germans reaction to the uncertain situation in many of the French departments resulted in the Germans wasting their limited resources. When the Germans were uncertain as to the security of the Indre department, they either concentrated a strong force to engage the resistance, thus reducing combat power elsewhere, or attempted to pass unprotected, which often resulted in a successful Maquis ambush. Either way the Germans lost.

Team Hugh reported on 12 August that:

Maquis attacked Boche outpost at Chambon near Ville Dieu. Captured all 15 Germans there plus 1 cannon and heavy MG. No maquis losses. 4 or 5 similar successful incidents take place every day but we have not the time to report them.**


Such reports emphasize the pressure placed on the Germans in their supposedly safe rear areas. These actions supported the Allied invasions (OVERLORD and DRAGOON). Another example of successful resistance action occurred when a column of 1,000 Germans attempted to leave Chateauroux on 21 August. The resistance ambushed the column killing over 200 Germans and capturing 100 vehicles, while sustaining minimal losses.**

Team Hugh's mission was twofold: assist SAS team "Bullbasket" establish a viable base of operation from which to raid German lines of communication and contact and report on the state of the resistance forces near Chateauroux. They accomplished their mission and then some. The SAS team easily married up with one of the resistance organizations early in the operation. It appeared that the most difficult portion of the mission was their requirement to report on the status of the resistance, which quickly turned into organizing and sustaining them.

This second task required the team to locate, meet, and assess various resistance organizations. The chief problem facing the team was to get these differing organizations to unite. By focusing the resistance against their one common enemy, the Germans, Captains Crawshay and L'Helgouach united the Maquis. This problem was exacerbated because of previous organizational efforts by SOE agents, who usually provided support based on political criteria, prior to the arrival of the Jedburghs. Generally, agents from F section supplied non-Gaullist resistance forces including communists, while agents from RF section supplied only Gaullist resistance forces. Thus, some of these resistance forces held opposing political views and struggled for post occupation dominance.³⁴

The most important aspect of the Jedburgh actions in Indre department centered on the ability of the resistance to apply enough pressure on the Germans to concentrate their forces; once massed, team Hugh relayed accurate locations for the Allied air force to bomb.


Around the 23rd of September, 1944, team Hugh returned to Great Britain to be debriefed by SFHQ. They were probably flown out of Le Blanc, near the Indre and Vienne border, for the short flight across the English Channel. Mission complete, and a job well done.



Map 2. French transportation networks

Additional towns:

- | | |
|--------------|----------------|
| 1. Angouleme | 3. Chateauroux |
| 2. Bourges | 4. Limoges |



Map 3. The Brenne area

(1" = 4 miles)

- * Woods of Luzeraize and Souvigny
- * Dunet
- * Belabre
- * La Gabriere
- * Le Blanc

CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

The members of team Hugh had operational code names as well as their true names. The French members usually had a nom de guerre. Listed below is some personal information on the team members.

True name: Captain (Sir) William R. Crawshay
Code name: CROWN
Nationality: British

Promoted to acting Major while in France. He received notice of the promotion via a normal wireless transmission from SFHQ on 26 August 1944. Sir William Crawshay presently resides in Wales, United Kingdom. Prior to the war Sir William Crawshay had lived in Paris where his step-father was Ambassador.

True name: Captain Louis L'Helgouach
Code name: FRANC
nom de guerre: Captain L. Legrand
Nationality: French

True name: Sub-Lieutenant Rene Meyer
Code name: YONNE
Nom de guerre: Sub-Lieutenant R. Mersiol
Nationality: French

Mr. Meyer presently resides in Vias, France.

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 3: 17.

² Ibid., 17,18; M.R.D. Foot, SOE In France An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-44 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), 122,404. Two F section circuits; WRESTLER and SHIPWRIGHT developed the area Hugh would operate in. SOE agent "Samuel" headed the SHIPWRIGHT circuit, which provided the reception

committee for Hugh. The use of established F circuit agents for reception committees and initial contact assisted the Jedburgh's entry into France. F section circuit STATIONER terminated with the capture of its leader. However, the wireless operator and courier of that circuit took the initiative to establish circuits WRESTLER and SHIPWRIGHT, which essentially took over the responsibilities of STATIONER. Pearl Witherington headed circuit WRESTLER and Amedee Maingard, code name "Samuel" headed circuit SHIPWRIGHT. "Samuel's" organization assisted "Bullbasket" in establishing its operational area. "Bullbasket" began its operation with nearly 50 men. They operated against the German rail and road line of communication between Bordeaux and Tours by direct action and providing target intelligence for the Allied air forces. According to Foot, the Germans trapped team "Bullbasket" on 3 July, captured one-third of the team and at once shot them. Mendelsohn's account of the affair is the W/T transmission from team Hugh to SFHQ on 7 July, which estimated the "Bullbasket" team lost 11 killed and 35 captured. Note. The spelling of this SAS group by Foot uses one "l" (Bulbasket) while Mendelsohn's Covert Warfare uses two "ls" (Bullbasket). Since Mendelsohn's volume is a reproduction of the official war diary, I will use his spelling in this document.

* Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 21, 87.

* Ibid., 21, 87, 88; Pierre Lorain, Clandestine Operations: The Arms and Techniques of the Resistance, 1941-1944 (New York: Macmillian Publishing, 1983), 110, 111. The Jedburghs used two types of containers to drop their arms and equipment to the field. The type C container was about the same size as a human body, opened in two along its length, and had four handles to accommodate carrying on the ground. It was made from sheet-metal, cylindrical in form, and reinforced by ribs. The type H container was about the same size as the C type, but less sturdy. It was made by connecting five sheet-metal drums together with two steel rods. This container could be carried in total or disassembled, which allowed each separate drum to be carried.

* Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 85.

* Ibid., 94.

* Ibid., 86.

* Ibid., 85, 86. The Armee Secrete is an element of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (FFI).

* Ibid., 1.

¹⁰ Foot, SOE In France, 33,358. On 1 July 1944 the Etat-major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (EMFFI) became operational to command and control all resistance forces in France that previously were segregated between SOE sections F and RF. French General Koenig, a supporter of de Gaulle, led these forces. SFHQ coordinated with the EMFFI and provided the resources for the EMFFI to conduct its operations.

¹¹ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 89,91,95; Foot, SOE In France, 237. Team Hugh spent much of its time initially coordinating and organizing the various resistance organizations. Hugh confronted three major groups, which were:

Deschelette, code name "Ellipse", was the Delegue Militaire Regional (DMR). The DMR was the local Gaullist leader in the region. "Ellipse's" representative in the department was code named "Croc". He was the Delegue Militaire Departmental (DMD). Each of these men belonged to the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (FFI).

Colonel Martel, alias "Commandant Charles", was a leader in the Organisation de Resistance de l'Armee (ORA). The ORA was a resistance organization in France comprised of members of the dissolved armistice army.

Rolland was the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) departmental chief. The FTP was the military wing of the French Communist party.

Surcouf, Chief of the Armee Secrete of Indre department and a member of the FFI.

¹² Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 88,90.

¹³ Ibid., 92; Foot, SOE in France, 226. Service d'atterrissages et parachutages, SAP, formerly called COPA, was the main facilitator for receipt and delivery of arms and equipment to the numerous resistance groups in contact with RF section agents in southern France. SAP also arranged transportation for French agents and politicians to travel between France and England.

¹⁴ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 71.

¹⁵ Ibid., 96,97.

¹⁶ Ibid., 72.

¹⁷ Ibid., 21,22.

¹⁸ Foot, SOE In France, 405; John Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 92,93; John Strawson, A History of the SAS Regiment (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 264. According to Strawson's book, mission "Bullbasket" was the 1st

SAS/Phantom consisting of 55 troops. 37 casualties resulted from a German SS attack on the base of which 33 troops were captured and executed.

10 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 93.

11 Ibid., 87, 92, 93.

12 Ibid., 92.

13 Ibid., 96.

14 Ibid., 69, 97.

15 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 5: 69; Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 98. Patrick was the fifth Operations Group to be infiltrated from Great Britain. Its mission was to assist the resistance and preserve the hydro-electric power plant at Eguzon. Secondary missions included attacking road, rail, and communications targets. The group consisted of 25 American soldiers: three officers and 22 enlisted men. In addition to securing the power plant at Eguzon, Patrick conducted numerous ambushes of German units. Patrick returned to London via a C-47 on 13 September.

16 Kurt Schuster, "The LXIV Army Corps in the Period from August to November, 1944", A-885: 3.

17 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 108.

18 Ibid., 101.

19 Foot, SOE In France, 88. The Westland Lysander was a small well built single-engine high-wing monoplane with a cruising speed of 165 m.p.h. Its radius of action was 450 miles when fitted with an extra tank. It could carry two passengers easily and four in a crisis, besides the pilot. Its total weight was close to four-and-one-half tons. This plane could land and take off over five or six hundred yards of firm grass. Successful use of the Lysanders in 1941-42 demonstrated the feasibility of moonlit landings on open fields in France. Thus, larger twin-engined aircraft were brought into service such as the armed Lockheed Hudsons in 1943-44 and unarmed American Douglas Dakotas after D-day. SOE successfully managed over one hundred pick-up sorties to France in which over 250 passengers were delivered and 450 personnel brought out. Two Lysanders, one pilot, and two agents were lost during those missions.

20 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 102, 103.

*0 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 81,83,104. Although the words on page 83 states "...and attached areas of Indre and Loire..." the author believes this is a misprint. It should read "...and attached areas of Indre et Loire..." On page 84 SFHQ responded to the team by stating "...congratulations on liberation Indre and Indre et Loire." Also, team Hugh never operated in the Loire department, which is a considerable distance south-east of team Hugh's operational area. Therefore, I used the more sensible description "Indre et Loire" vice "Indre and Loire" in this paper.

*1 Schuster, "LXIV Army Corp", A-885: 7.

*2 Ibid., 74.

*3 Ibid., 79.

*4 Ibid., 88; Foot, SOE in France, xviii.

CHAPTER THREE

TEAM HAMISH

The fifth Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom was team Hamish. This Jedburgh team spent three and one-half months in France, before completing its mission and returning to Great Britain in late September, 1944. SFHQ deployed this team at the request of team Hugh, which preceded team Hamish by one week. The team leader was American Lieutenant Robert M. Anstett, the French officer was Lieutenant Rene Schmitt, and the American radio operator was Sergeant L.J. Watters.¹

Team Hamish's mission consisted of several tasks, but was primarily geared to organizing and supplying the resistance forces in the southeast Indre department. SFHQ's specific tasks were: assist team Hugh in the organization of resistance forces in the Indre department, focus on establishing separate groups of about 100 to 200 men each, avoid organizing large groups unless ordered to do so, report on the state of the resistance forces to include potential, arms, leadership, and personnel. They were also to select landing zones for DC-3 aircraft, and establish liaison between the resistance forces and the SAS to facilitate the SAS base of operations.²

Team Hamish, like other Milton Hall based teams alerted for a mission, received a briefing from SFHQ prior to departure to the airfield. This briefing included information on the enemy order of battle, location of airfields, petrol dumps, vehicle parks, factories, police and Gestapo locations, curfew restrictions, terrain analysis with an emphasis on lines of communications, and descriptions of other Allied agents in the Indre department.*

During the night of 12/13 June 1944, team Hamish parachuted onto a drop zone established by team Hugh near Belabre. The "jump" altitude of the aircraft was too low, which resulted in a bad drop and three shaken Jedburghs. Sergeant Watters severely sprained both ankles upon impact. This injury hampered his mobility to the extent that he was still unable to walk without limping several months later.*

Team Hamish stayed at a farm near Belabre, where team Hugh briefed them on the current situation. His area of operations was the Aigurande - La Chatre sector of southeast Indre. [map page 59] The team members moved to their assigned sector on 15 June where they occupied a farmhouse 15 kilometers north of Aigurande. The team would move its headquarters frequently during the three and one-half months it stayed behind enemy lines. They left Aigurande to relocate near St. Severe on 23 June, where they stayed until moving near Viljon on 9 July. Sometime around 22 July team Hamish moved near Beddes. The team did not report th

location of its headquarters until 10 September, then reported at Issoudun. It is very likely they moved several times between 22 July and 10 September.*

Resistance forces supplied by team Hamish interdicted two major rail/road lines of communication. The first being the rail line between Limoges and Chateauroux, which team Hugh's forces also targeted. The road running from Chateauroux - Issoudun - Bourges became important during late August and early September when the German withdrawal was at its peak in the Indre. The interdiction effort resulted in slowing down the Germans withdrawal, thus causing more casualties from ambushes and Allied aerial bombardment.*

On 17 June team Hamish met with various resistance groups to assess the strength, training, and weaponry of each group. Based on earlier reports from the resistance, the team expected to find 550 armed men, of whom only 200 were trained. Team Hamish found this estimate to be far too low. This proved inconsequential, however, since there were many men willing to join the resistance. In all meetings the Jedburghs were extremely well received. The resistance provided the Jedburghs transportation to meet other resistance groups. During this period the resistance practically controlled the countryside, which made motor travel fairly easy. However, the Germans occasionally patrolled the roads, which made resistance movement then rather dangerous.*

During team Hamish's initial visits to the various resistance groups, the team recognized a potential problem in unifying the groups. The problem was political and concerned the lack of trust between the Gaullist and the communist (FTP) groups. In an effort to solve this problem, between the local Gaullist and FTP leaders, team Hamish held a meeting in Aigurande. During this meeting an accord was established between the three, but it proved to be of little value, as the Gaullist and FTP groups resisted cooperation with each other. Although all resistance forces in France were to cooperate under the guidance of the FFI, local rivalries continued to plague this effort. The Jedburgh's challenge was to constantly remind the local groups of their chief enemy, the Germans. In doing so, the Jedburghs maintained some unity of effort directed against the Germans."

Around 20 June the Germans attacked a wooded area about two kilometers from the team's safehouse near Aigurande. The Germans attacked this area based on their use of direction finding (DF) equipment. This attack almost resulted in the capture of team Hamish's radio operator, Sergeant Watters. Resistance forces carried Sergeant Watters, because of his previous injury, into a field nearby where he spent several hours waiting for the Germans to leave. During this attack the Germans captured one man, killed two, and captured a car."

The strength of the resistance forces increased greatly during team Hamish's stay. When the team arrived in southeast Indre, the resistance forces numbered approximately 200 to 300 men. When the Jedburghs left in mid September they claimed to have 3,000 fighting men with another 1,000 waiting for arms. By 8 July team Hamish reported having three battalions at their disposal. Each battalion included two completely trained and armed companies of 160 men deployed and a third company in formation. Two battalions deployed near Vijon and the third near Aigurande.¹⁰

These companies carried a variety of weapons: pistols, Stens, carbines, sub-machine guns, Brens, rifles, and bazookas. Due to supply constraints, SFHQ did not provide certain weapons requested by the team, but the Jedburghs made do with what was available. Although requested several times, team Hamish never received mortars or heavy machine-guns. A message from SFHQ on 28 July stated that mortars and heavy machine-guns were not available. Team Hamish reported that the resistance forces had numerous accidents with weapons and consequently the team began a policy to reduce these accidents. This policy prohibited the resistance forces from carrying loaded guns except while on guard or going into action.¹¹

Team Hamish had to coordinate the actions of the various resistance groups employed against the Germans. Besides working with the southeast Indre resistance, the

team ventured into the northern Creuse department on 19 June to examine its potential, as well as determine the fate of a military mission reportedly captured by the Germans.

The team received a warm welcome from the FFI chief. Team Hamish assessed the group favorably and recommended a Jedburgh team be dispatched to the Creuse. SFHQ, however, advised team Hamish that the Creuse was already scheduled to receive support and that team Hamish should return to the southern Cher.¹²

Team Hamish was successful in finding a resistance group in need of a Jedburgh team. The southern end of the Cher department, near St. Amand, became their responsibility on 31 July as authorized by SFHQ. The team made contact with Lieutenant Hubert, chief of a small FTP group of about 150, near the end of July. Consequently, the Jedburghs arranged an arms supply drop for Lieutenant Hubert in return for a commitment to support team Hamish. This support however, only applied to the Jedburghs because the FTP Lieutenant would not join the Gaullist forces in Indre. Other resistance groups soon sought out the Jedburghs to receive similar support. Recognizing the potential in the southern Cher, Hamish recommended that SFHQ dispatch a Jedburgh team to assist that area. SFHQ sent Jedburgh team Ivor on the night of 6/7 August to organize the resistance in the southern Cher.¹³

In late June the Jedburghs met with "Ellipse" and "Croc", DMR and Delegue Militaire Departmental (DMO, military leader for a department) respectively of the FFI. The purpose of the meeting was to plan the organization and future employment of the FFI. Team Hamish avoided interfering with the resistance's internal security and discipline, but observed them in practice. The Indre FFI tried and executed one of its members found guilty of rape. They also killed two other Frenchmen suspected of being traitors. One of the latter was an old man from the town of Gueret, who disclosed the location of an FFI ambush to the Germans. The other was a Milicien, found within the ranks of the FFI. The resistance also maintained an extortion, or what they termed a "police", organization which extracted money from collaborators in the area.¹⁴

Team Hamish's organization matured between late June and mid-July. A typical day during this time generally found Lieutenant Anstett maintaining the logistics and administration, Lieutenant Schmitt overseeing the training, and Sergeant Watters recovering at their headquarters. During the mornings Lieutenant Anstett sought answers to SFHQ queries and inventoried equipment received the night before. Lieutenant Schmitt began training the forces at 0800 hours. A coordination meeting between the team and FFI chief "Robert" usually took place at 1100 hours. Problems such as training methods, German agent infiltrations, and operational

planning for targets were topics of discussion. At 1330 hours a member of the team monitored the BBC broadcast for any messages that applied to the FFI or team Hamish. Companies received their orders in the afternoon for upcoming night attacks or drop zone reception missions. Other afternoon activities included the interrogation of enemy prisoners, small unit maneuvers practiced and critiqued, inspection of the Jedburgh's stores, and encoding messages for later transmission. Supper and monitoring of the second BBC transmission took place at 1930 hours. If a resupply drop took place that night, Lieutenants Anstett or Schmitt accompanied the resistance party conducting the reception. They usually departed around 2100 hours.¹⁰

Team Hamish reported that the training of the resistance forces took place under the direction of resistance officers and NCOs. The shortage of resistance officers and NCOs, however, hampered the training of the resistance troops. There were not enough resistance "leaders" within the force to satisfactorily lead all the resistance troops. The team attempted to solve this problem in several ways. Lieutenant Schmitt employed the concept of "training the trainers", as he conducted training classes for the officers and NCOs. As an interim measure the team organized a school for officers and NCOs. This school trained members of the resistance who exhibited leadership potential. The team requested that SFHQ send French officers

and NCOs to fill the leadership void. SFHQ did not dispatch any French officers or NCOs, but Hamish did benefit from General De Gaulle's mobilization order, which mobilized all French officers and NCOs in France. Three officers of superb ability and a number of good NCOs joined team Hamish's resistance organization as a result of De Gaulle's order.¹⁶

The resistance groups supported by Hamish outstripped the ability of SFHQ to sustain them after 1 August. Hamish received approximately 40 plane loads of supplies between mid-June and 1 August. But, between 1 August and 20 September they received only seven plane loads. A 23 August message from Hamish to SFHQ stated that they had 700 men in their FFI force without arms and at the same time had been solicited by others for arms and equipment. In one case 300 resistance volunteers went without arms because the team and SFHQ could not supply them. Not wanting to miss the opportunity to help fight the Germans, this 300 man group left the Indre area in search of someone who could arm them.¹⁷

Besides the lack of qualified French officers and NCOs within the ranks of the recruits and the failure of SFHQ to supply mortars and heavy machine-guns, team Hamish encountered additional problems. During a resupply drop the parachutes did not open on 12 containers. The rifles and Brens in those containers were smashed and rendered unserviceable as a result of the impact. Petrol was scarce

because of German rationing, but the team occasionally augmented what petrol was available with petrol via air drops. Maps suitable for planning small scale guerrilla operations, particularly 1:50,000 scale, of the southeast Indre were not available. This hampered some of the team's operations. A more pressing problem was being attacked by Allied aircraft. To avoid strafing by "friendly" aircraft, the resistance forces painted white stars on their vehicles. Hamish's message of 25 August requested SFHQ to inform the Air Corps to avoid strafing vehicles with the white stars on them.¹³

Team Hamish apparently enjoyed the same freedom of action that team Hugh did prior to the massive German withdrawal in mid-August. The Jedburghs used bonfires for their night resupply drops through the end of July. An early report indicated the resistance groups practically controlled their sector. A 27 June message from Hamish to SFHQ reported they could not step up guerrilla operations because they could not find any Germans to attack. The German's first attack on the FFI came in mid-July, when two FFI trucks ran into several German light armored cars near the town of Marembert. This engagement quickly escalated into a major battle as the FFI employed 600 troops against the German force of nine light armed cars and three truckloads of soldiers armed with 37mm cannon and several 20mm cannon. By evening the Germans had withdrawn towards Chateauroux with

unknown losses. The FFI lost 15 killed and three wounded. The Jedburghs did not intend for the FFI to engage the Germans in this manner so early. Lieutenant Anstett's intention was for the FFI to conduct guerrilla operations against the enemy's communications and avoid any major engagement with the Germans which would cause the FFI losses.^{1*}

Team Hamish provided information to SFHQ on the status of airfields, including the Luftwaffe strength at Chateauroux. They also reported the location of an alleged German V-1 or V-2 flying bomb launching site southeast of Bourges. Given the distance between Great Britain and Bourges, and the range of the V-1 or V-2 rocket, it is unlikely the launching sites reported were for V-1 or V-2 rockets destined for London. The team also reported to SFHQ the location of the Billancourt factory, which manufactured a twin-engine transport aircraft. This factory was decentralized into four areas, thus improving its survivability from aerial bombing attacks. However, team Hamish made plans to sabotage its facilities. Whether or not the team began the sabotage effort is unknown.^{2*}

Team Hamish conducted its first attack on 4 July, destroying three bridges between La Chatre and Montlucon and one south of St. Amand. In addition they derailed a train between Chateameillant and La Chatre. The next day the resistance stole a truck loaded with a large amount of

butter from the Germans and distributed it throughout the area. Ambushes in early August killed 22 Germans and destroyed three Milice petrol trucks with 22 Miliciens killed. The resistance had no casualties. The FFI forces captured the commanding general of La Premier Regiment de France near Aigurande on 8 August. Elements of this regiment eventually joined with the FFI in fighting against the Germans."¹

The majority of the resistance fighting followed the the Germans evacuation of Chateauroux around 20 August, their subsequent withdrawal through the Cher River Valley and along highway 151 between Chateauroux and Bourges. In the first instance the resistance established ambushes in depth between Chateauroux and Bourges. One of the German convoys ambushed consisted of approximately 1,000 cyclists that departed Chateauroux on 21 August. These ambushes occurred over a four day period, reportedly killing 600 Germans and causing numerous delays for the withdrawing enemy. In early September the FFI moved two battalions north between highway 151 and the Cher River Valley to ambush German convoys moving through the valley. Trapped by the enemy during their movement north, the two battalions relied on the Jedburghs for help. Captain Schmitt successfully called for air strikes, which enabled the surrounded battalions to escape."²

Like Captain Crawshay of team Hugh, Lieutenant Anstett also returned to London to discuss the situation with SFHQ. He flew out of the Le Blanc airfield (probably via a Dakota operation) on the night of 27 August. Lieutenant Anstett requested an American armored column to move on Chateauroux to stop the German's use of the Cher River Valley. If this was not possible, he sought additional arms and ammunition for the unarmed volunteer FFI in his sector. SFHQ did not approve either of these requests, but did approve the Jedburgh's third request, which sought some sort of air liaison to counter the German forces still to the west of Indre. Lieutenant Anstett flew to Limoges on 9 September and linked up with his team in Issoudun the next day."³

Team Hamish attended the second liberation ceremony in Chateauroux on 11 September, which essentially completed their mission in the Indre. The first liberation ceremony on 27 August proved premature. The town was not liberated, only temporarily vacated by the Germans stationed there. More Germans passed through shortly. The team also attended a grand reunion dinner on 18 September for all the Maquis. On 19 September the team received a message from SFHQ instructing them to report to the Etat Major at Les Invalides, Paris for further orders. In addition, the American members were to report to Colonel Jackson at 79 Champs Elysee, Paris. The team arrived in Paris on 21 September and on 24 September returned to London."⁴


"TEAM HAMISH - CONCLUSION"

Jedburgh team Hamish successfully accomplished its primary mission, assisting Jedburgh team Hugh organize resistance in Indre department. Several of the team's assigned tasks, however, were not fulfilled. They were unable to accomplish the tasks because of circumstances beyond their control. SAS team "Bullbasket" did not require assistance by the time Hamish arrived, because team Hugh already took care of the task. Team Hamish was unable to locate a DC-3 landing zone within their area of operation, but was able to locate a field suitable for a Lysander and four drop zones."

Team Hamish entered the field under an unusual command and control situation. Normally, Jedburgh teams were under the direct command and control of SFHQ. Team Hamish, however, was to agree with Jedburgh team Hugh on the division of field responsibility. How this arrangement worked remains uncertain, but it appears to have met the initial requirement. Based on the records available, team Hamish conducted all of its W/T correspondence with SFHQ and not team Hugh. There are few accounts of direct communication between the two Jedburgh teams, but this does not rule out the possibility of the Jedburghs relying on FFI communications to coordinate activities. According to Mr. Loosmore, the teams in the field could only communicate with other Jedburgh teams through messages passed via the FFI and

the only W/T communications was between the teams and SFHQ. It is quite likely other Jedburgh teams communicated between each other via the resistance and the W/T correspondence was between the teams and SFHQ. SFHQ apparently was not requested to pass messages between the Jedburgh teams."*

According to team Hamish, the greatest contribution they made was the continuous cutting of the Limoges - Chateauroux - Orleans railroad line. The numerous road ambushes and continuous cutting of telephone lines in their sector also helped keep the Germans off balance. However, the fact that team Hamish sustained three resistance battalions for combat while working in the enemy's rear area was a significant feat in itself."*



Map 4. Aigurande and La Chaux Area

(1" = 4 miles)

* Chateauroux * Eguzon

CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES

The members of team Hamish had operational code names as well as their true names. The French members usually had a nom de guerre. Listed below is some personal information of the team members.

True name: Lieutenant Robert M. Anstett
Code name: ALABAMA
Nationality: American

Mr. Robert M. Anstett currently resides in Westport, Connecticut.

True name: Lieutenant Rene Schmitt
Code name: LOUISIANA
Nom de guerre: Lieutenant L. Blachere
Nationality: French

True name: Sergeant L.J. Watters
Code name: KANSAS
Nationality: American

Sergeant Watters was the W/T operator. The first message team Hamish received from SFHQ informed the team that Sergeant Watters was promoted to First Sergeant on 13 June. Thought to be living in Ohio.

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 3: 46.

• Ibid., 47, 49.

• Ibid., 50.

• Ibid., 281, 88.

• Ibid., 281-289.

• Ibid., 278, 297.

7 Ibid., 281.

8 Ibid., 282.

9 Ibid., 282.

10 Ibid., 287, 296, 283.

11 Ibid., 268, 283, 284.

12 Ibid., 268, 282.

13 Ibid., 289.

14 Ibid., 283, 284.

15 Ibid., 285, 286, 289. The administration and record keeping appeared to be a significant duty of the Jedburghs. Detailed personnel records were kept of each new Maquis recruit. The team members handled large sums of cash. Team Hamish distributed 85,000 francs to families of Maquisards killed in action. Additionally, each Maquis member received ten francs per day. During the mission, team Hamish was responsible for more than three million francs.

16 Ibid., 287.

17 Ibid., 276, 293. Major Stanislaw Malecinski approached the Jedburghs in want of arms. He claimed to have 300 men who would fight under the command of the FFI in Indre. Major Malecinski had been in France since 1939. He was in the Duxieme Bureau Detat Major Polonaise at Paris prior to the 1940 armistice.

18 Ibid., 265, 276, 267.

19 Ibid., 267, 282.

20 Ibid., 290, 269.

21 Ibid., 265, 291; Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 638. La Premier Regiment de France was part of the Vichy government's armed forces. This regiment had units located in various places to include St. Amand and Dun-Sur-Auron. The Germans integrated these French units into the German force structure, although the Germans did question the French unit's reliability. Consequently, the Germans watched these units and were able to disarm them if necessary.

22 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 278, 292. On page 274 the 20 August message from Hamish to SFHQ in part states "...Pruniers and Lignieres 30 Kms west Chateauroux." This is in error and should read "...Pruniers and Lignieres 30 Kms east Chateauroux." These two villages are east of Chateauroux and not west.

23 Ibid., 292-298.

24 Ibid., 280.

25 Ibid., 285.

26 Ibid., 48.

27 Ibid., 297.

CHAPTER FOUR

TEAM IAN

Jedburgh team Ian parachuted into the Vienne department of France on the night of 20/21 June, 1944. They were the sixth Jedburgh team dispatched from the United Kingdom. At the time of Ian's dispatch, all resistance forces in Vienne were under the control of agent "Samuel" of F section's SHIPWRIGHT circuit. The team leader was American Major John Gildee, the French officer was Lieutenant Alexandre Desfarges, and the American W/T operator was Sergeant Lucien Bourgoïn.¹

Team Ian's primary mission was to contact agent "Samuel" and help him organize the resistance in Vienne. "Samuel" had earlier requested the assistance of a Jedburgh team. SFHQ also directed the team to create small teams of resistance forces to maintain continuous attacks against two railway lines (Bordeaux - Poitiers - Tours, and Bordeaux - Niort - Saumur), explore the possibility of controlling several square miles of terrain to allow a large, daylight paratroop or equipment drop, and organize, train, supply, and employ resistance forces in Charente department. Team Ian was to inform the resistance in Vienne that a general uprising at that time should not occur, as the availability

of supplies could not be assured. SFHQ planned 15 to 20 air sorties for the Ian mission."

Prior to departing for Harrington Airfield, the team members received their mission briefing. Included in the briefing was information on the enemy order of battle, location and defense of fuel and ammunition depots, airfields and landing grounds, police and Gestapo locations, and terrain analysis with an emphasis on road and rail networks. The team also received a list of friendly agents in the area.

The Jedburgh's first flight to France on 18 June turned back because of poor visibility. This was a "non-moon drop", which meant the illumination from the moon was minimal and the only lights used to identify the drop zone were those set-up by the reception committee. The pilot was unsure of the aircraft's location and could not identify the drop zone, so they returned to Harrington Airfield. The second attempt proved successful when the three Jedburghs parachuted onto a drop zone south of Poitiers early on 21 June. The drop zone however, was not chosen by the reception committee to receive personnel, but equipment, as the reception committee from "Samuel's" organization expected to receive equipment, not personnel. The drop zone was rocky, hard, small, and surrounded by barbed wire, trees, and ditches. Fortunately for the Jedburghs, all three landed safely, but the radios were damaged on impact. Sergeant Bourgoin's parachute was slow to open, which also made for a hair-raising event. In

addition to their normal load, team Ian brought with them one million francs for "Samuel" and special explosive charges to be used against the railroad lines.*

The primary target in team Ian's area of operation was the railroad line running from Angouleme to Poitiers. This was a section of the important Bordeaux - Tours line. Although the team travelled by car a great deal throughout the region, the majority of activity took place between the Vienne River on the east, Angouleme to the south, the railroad line and highway 10 to the west, and Poitiers to the north.*

Team Ian began their organizational efforts by contacting the numerous Maquis chiefs in southwest Vienne and in the Charente department. They travelled to observe the local Maquis, the Maquis strength, training, and equipment. The Jedburghs also wanted to see the drop zones selected by the Maquis as well as any field fortifications erected. In addition, team Ian took advantage of their journey to establish a network of agents for liaison and intelligence gathering and to make contact with the gendarmerie and Postes, Telegraphes, Telephones (PTT) to gain their support. The PTT was the French government telecommunication system. In both cases, the Jedburghs received good support.*

Team Ian's mission entailed considerable traveling, which was dangerous because of the German presence. Team Ian did not travel clandestinely, which eventually cost the Jedburghs the life of Sergeant Bourgoin and the car's driver. The team assumed they could escape the enemy with speed and firepower if engaged. They consequently modified a car into a "reconnaissance vehicle", equipping it with two machine-guns and a radio. In this manner the Jedburghs were able to contact the Maquis much faster than teams Hugh or Hamish did. This concept proved invalid however, when Sergeant Bourgoin and the car's driver were killed by Germans who apparently drove quickly and shot surprisingly well.7

The first Maquis located by team Ian were from Civray and Charroux. They were lightly armed with a few Stens, assorted guns, several pounds of explosives and numbered 125 and 50 respectively. This encounter proved quite beneficial for the Jedburghs as well as the Maquis. Team Ian immediately requested additional arms and explosives for the two groups. The Maquis in turn conducted the first sabotage for the Jedburgh's, cutting the rail line north and south of Civray. This railroad line was repeatedly cut according to the teams report. The team contacted other Maquis groups at the following towns: Ruffec, 100 men which formed a base for a larger group; Champagnition, 200 men commanded by "Garnier" which formed a base for a larger group; Confolens, 500 men armed with a few rifles and led by

"Bernard" of Limoges; Sauze-Vaussais, 100 men; Chasseneuil, 300 men led by "Chabanne" which formed a base for a larger group; and Civray, having increased to 200 men commanded by "Bernard" of Civray. A police lieutenant in Ruffec provided useful information for the Jedburghs and the Maquis on the intentions of the gendarmerie, which were benevolent towards the resistance and team Ian."

Team Ian arranged supply drops for the Maquis with arms, ammunition, and clothes. They also instructed the Maquis in the art of guerrilla warfare, with particular emphasis on ambushes and rail sabotage. The Maquis employed their newly learned skills and supplies in early July by interdicting rail and road traffic between Angouleme and Chaunay. Also during this time, a German battalion attacked a Maquis group near Confolens. The Maquis reportedly fought well and the Germans withdrew after several hours fighting."

Unable to locate a leader for the various resistance groups in Charente, team Ian assumed that duty and began organizing and deploying the Maquis. This activity began around 20 July and provided a solid military structure in the German rear area. The Maquis established a stronghold in the area between the towns of Charroux, Confolens, Chasseneuil, and Champagne-Mouton. [map page 74] They strengthened this area by mining bridges and establishing barricades of logs and masonry on the roads leading into it.¹⁰

Within this fortified area four Maquis battalions formed and trained. The strength of these four battalions stood at 6,000 by the end of July. This fortified area provided a temporary safehaven for the Maquis, as the area provided good communications, transportation, and logistics support. The telephone network was capable of contacting Angouleme, Limoges, Ruffec and Sivray. Valuable information passed over this network which rapidly informed the Jedburghs of German activities as well as the results of their own operations. The Maquis also drove motorcycles and used carrier-pigeons to pass information between groups. The battalions achieved some tactical flexibility through the use of several motorized companies. Between the four battalions, they had enough vehicles to mount several companies of Maquis, giving them the capability to quickly deploy within their sector.¹¹

The four battalions were named after their Maquis chiefs: Bonnet, Chabanne, Bernard (of Limoges), and Gagner. Assisting the chiefs were former regular or reserve army officers and NCOs who joined the Maquis. These army personnel fit in very well with the resistance forces. Assisting each battalion chief was a regular officer to serve as a technical advisor for operations. Team Ian performed the duties of a regimental headquarters, commanding the four battalions. They focused on operational matters, and like team Hamish, avoided disciplinary matters, local supply and

requisitions, which fell to the battalion chiefs. Financially, the four battalions received support from different sources. The Vienne resistance movement supported battalion Bonnet. The FTP of Limoges supported battalion Bernard. Battalion Chabanne and Garnier however, had no funds. In late July funding became available through the FFI office in Paris with the approval of SFHQ.¹²

During this build up period, the Jedburghs received the support of Colonel Degas, former commander of the 502nd tank regiment. He had served as chief of the resistance in Charente, but the Gestapo had forced him to flee. He provided useful assistance through his knowledge of the area and its people. Colonel Degas contacted Maquis groups in western and southern Charente. The Jedburghs also were in contact with the chief of resistance of Dordogne department. In all, team Ian requested 2,300 arms for the Charente and Dordogne departments, but unfortunately it was late August and by then it was too late for SFHQ to support this effort.¹³

Aside from encounters with the enemy, team Ian had several problems that affected its performance. Communication with London (SFHQ) early in the mission was poor because of the damaged radios. Fortunately, the team was able to relay information on "Samuel's" radio during the first week. The Jedburghs experienced an operational procedure error during their first several equipment drops.

The team failed to send "cracks" (a code transmitted to to the aircraft indicating the team was ready to receive additional equipment drops) to the aircraft dropping the supplies, thus, causing the pilot to cancel the drop. Once SFHQ clarified to the team what "cracks" were, the problem did not recur. The loss of the radio cipher codes in early August caused more communication problems, but apparently was overcome by using "Samuel's" radio. Although the Maquis repeatedly cut the railroad lines, the Germans quickly repaired the damaged tracks. Team Ian reported that although they did not stop the rail traffic, they did disrupt and delay rail movement.¹⁴

According to team Ian, guerrilla operations against the Germans were continuous. The Jedburghs reported that every night the Maquis blew the rail and bridge lines between Angouleme - Civray and Angouleme - Saintes. Ambushes along roads and attacks against trains, railroad tracks and bridges resulted in a German reaction on 20 July. Some 800 Germans attacked and penetrated the Maquis's fortified sector and successfully occupied Champagne-Mouton. There the Germans took French hostages and threatened to shoot the hostages and burn the town if the Maquis attacked. The Maquis did not attack, but waited for the Germans to seek them out. This German attack resulted in several engagements over a three week period. Additional German forces from Angouleme and Ruffec arrived and were well equipped with

heavy machine-guns, mortars, and transportation. Engagements took place in Ambernac, St. Claud, La Rochefoucault, Pleuville, and Chabanais. During these engagements the Germans destroyed civil property and killed civilians. On 26 July they ransacked the town of Ambernac, killing civilians and burning farms. The enemy also burned a whole district in Chabonnais and killed several civilians. During this period of increased hostilities, team Ian reported that the enemy lost about 200 men, while the Maquis lost about 80 in battle. Unable to decisively engage and defeat the Maquis, the Germans abandoned Champagne-Mouton and withdrew to Ruffec and Angouleme in early August.¹⁰

When the Germans seized Champagne-Mouton, they divided the Maquis, north and south. In addition they cut the Maquis's telephone lines and ambushed the motorcyclists, thus rendering the communication network useless. Attempting to reestablish communications with the fragmented Maquis to provide support and orders for movement, team Ian undertook a hazardous journey in their "reconnaissance" car. On 3 August the Germans ambushed the Jedburghs in the town of Pleuville. As the Jedburghs drove their reconnaissance car into Pleuville, the Germans opened fire with mortars and three machine-guns firing at close range. Sergeant Bourgoin and the driver were killed. Major Gildee, Lieutenant Desfarges, and the information agent "Verry" barely escaped. The two surviving Jedburghs avoided capture by hiding in a woods near

town until nightfall, then slipped past a German outpost to freedom. The team also lost their reconnaissance vehicle, radio, radio cipher codes, and a large sum of money. Unable to find the Jedburghs after thoroughly searching the town, the Germans set fire to 18 buildings.¹⁶


On 3 September team Ian reported that the Maquis occupied three quarters of Charente department. After the capture of Angouleme by the Maquis in early September, the FFI established a headquarters there to provide for the administration, security, and police organization in the area. With the Germans gone and the Maquis establishing civil order, the Jedburghs informed SFHQ on 15 September that their work was complete. SFHQ's last message to team Ian instructed Major Gildee to report to OSS Headquarters at 79 Champs Elysees, Paris and Lieutenant Desfarges to report to Commandant Lejeune at Les Invalides, Paris.¹⁷

"TEAM IAN - CONCLUSION"

Jedburgh team Ian accomplished its mission, which was to assist agent "Samuel" and the Vienne resistance and to organize, arm, train, and direct the resistance in Charente. It is unclear as to what the team did regarding the requirement to locate a large drop zone for daylight personnel or equipment drops. The loss of Sergeant Bourgoin might have been avoided if their movements had been more

clandestine. However, as reported by team Ian, their concept of travel was to do so openly, not clandestinely, and overcome any encounter with speed and firepower.^{1*}

The resistance in the team's area of operations grew from a few poorly armed groups to a force of about 6,000 armed men. The team reported they could have fielded 20,000 men had JFHQ been able to supply them. The Maquis, with assistance from team Ian, harassed the Germans for three months by ambushing road convoys, blowing up railroad lines, derailing trains, impeding convoy movements, thus making them susceptible to Allied air bombardment, and finally liberating all of Charente department as well as a large portion of Maritime department along the coast.^{1*}



Map 5. Team Ian's stronghold

(1" = 4 miles)

* Charroux * Confolens * Chasseneuil * Pleuville
 * Champagne-Mouton

CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES

The members of team Ian had operational code names as well as their true names. The French members usually had a nom de guerre. Listed below is some personal information on the team members.

True name: Major John Gildee
Code name: OKLAHOMA
Nationality: American

Reportedly lives in a nursing home in Quincy, Massachusetts.

True name: Lieutenant Alexandre Desfarges
Code name: MAINE
nom de guerre: Lieutenant Y. Delorme
Nationality: French

Lieutenant Desfarges reportedly stayed in the French Army and retired as a Colonel. He lives in Enghien, France.

Authors note: Lieutenant Delorme's name is spelled "Deslorme" on page 54 of Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, Volume 3 and "Delorme" on all other pages including 310 and 316. The proper nom de guerre is "Delorme".

True name: Sergeant Lucien Bourgoin
Code name: MAYO
Nationality: American

Served as the team W/T operator. Killed in action, 3 August 1944, Pleuville, France.

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 3: 54.

² Ibid., 55, 57, 306.

³ Ibid., 58.

* Ibid., 55,306,307. Team Ian spent the first five days of their mission at a farm with agent "Samuel" awaiting two more radio sets. The radios that accompanied them were damaged during the drop. When the new radios arrived, they too were damaged during the drop. Sergeant Bourgoin repaired one of the damaged radios.

• Ibid., 310.

• Ibid., 308.

7 Ibid., 302,308.

• Ibid., 299,307-308.

• Ibid., 309.

10 Ibid., 310.

11 Ibid., 311,312.

12 Ibid., 310,311.

13 Ibid., 312,313.

14 Ibid., 299,300,307. SFHQ referred to "cracks" as three number groups which team Ian was to transmit to the inbound aircraft. The receipt of one of these code groups from the team informed the aircraft that the Jedburghs were able to accommodate extra aircraft. Team Ian was to transmit "349", "402", or "568" to the resupply aircraft on the night of 11 July.

15 Ibid., 313,314.

16 Ibid., 313,317.

17 Ibid., 306,320.

18 Ibid., 57,306.

19 Ibid., 321.

CHAPTER FIVE

TEAM ANDY

Jedburgh team Andy's mission was the shortest in duration of the six Jedburgh teams studied in this thesis. It may have been the shortest mission of all 93 Jedburgh missions to France. Team Andy was the twelfth Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom. The team leader was British Major R.A. Parkinson, the Frenchman was Commandant J. Vermeulen, and the radio operator was British Sergeant Glyn Loosmore¹

Team Andy's mission, as directed by SFHQ, consisted of numerous tasks. The team's primary task was to contact and assist the DMR of region five, "Ellipse", and organize the resistance forces in the Haute Vienne department. Their other tasks included, avoiding any large scale operations unless approved by SFHQ, create small sabotage teams capable of cutting the railroad lines converging in Limoges, determine the possibility of controlling an area large enough to accommodate a daylight equipment drop, determine the possibility of controlling an airfield or landing ground capable of sustaining supply operations, and report on the organization, arms, strength and condition of FFI groups.²

Alerted for their mission, team Andy departed Milton Hall and travelled by road to London for their mission briefing. Team Andy received their briefing for a mission to Fontainebleau, France, which was soon cancelled. Their second mission briefing prepared the team for operations in the Haute Vienne department. From the briefing site the team went to their departure airfield, where they boarded a modified Liberator bomber. Departing on the night of 11/12 July for their drop, the flight crew failed to locate the drop zone and returned to England.^a

In the early morning of 12 July team Andy parachuted onto a drop zone established by an "Ellipse" reception committee near Douadic, north of Le Blanc in the Indre department. The team did not land in their designated department, Haute Vienne, because the pilot was lost. Although the Jedburghs dropped where a reception committee was present, the drop zone lights were for another purpose. Later, when "Croc", "Ellipse's" assistant, met with the team, "Croc" expressed surprise at the arrival of team Andy in Indre, saying he had expected the team to arrive in Haute Vienne. According to Sergeant Loosmore, the resistance personnel manning the drop zone did not expect team Andy, but did expect and received four agents dropped earlier that night. The jump did not go well. On the first pass the first jumper did not exit because of fouled static lines from the equipment containers. Once the static lines were properly

placed, the aircraft returned to the dropping zone and Commandant Vermeulen jumped first followed by Major Parkinson. Again the static lines fouled, thus, preventing Sergeant Loosmore from jumping. The aircraft made another circle, allowing time to rearrange the static lines, and on passing the drop zone a third time Sergeant Loosmore jumped.⁴

Team Andy's mission essentially ended when Commandant Vermeulen and Major Parkinson landed. The major sustained a double compound fracture of the left leg and Commandant Vermeulen broke one ankle. Sergeant Loosmore landed well. Reception committee personnel carried the two injured Jedburghs into a nearby farm house, where Major Parkinson was laid out on the kitchen table. Within an hour a French doctor arrived and put a temporary splint on Major Parkinson's leg. The farmhouse was quite busy with resistance activity when the Jedburghs arrived. Present were: reception committee partisans, four agents who had arrived one-half hour earlier, and Second Lieutenant Carl Bundgaard, an American pilot from the 505th Fighter Squadron, who baled out of his plane several nights earlier.⁵

During the next ten days, team Andy and Second Lieutenant Bundgaard were moved by car three times. The first move took them to a chateau about 15 kilometers from the drop zone. The team arrived at the chateau about 0500 hours. That afternoon a surgeon, accompanied by the doctor who splinted the leg, set Major Parkinson's broken leg and

put a plaster cast on his leg. "Croc" and the team discussed the team's safety and future use, which was quite limited. SFHQ decided to evacuate the two injured Jedburghs and assigned the radio operator to support "Ellipse". The team moved to a Maquis recruit training area near Preuilly, where they stayed several days and later moved again to La Gabriere, about 18 kilometers away. They moved in a three car convoy that was well armed, travelling on back roads and tracks. The final hideout for the Jedburghs was a farm called La Trillaudiere about one and one-half kilometers from the village of La Gabriere.* [map page 38]

With the exception of one close encounter with the Germans, the Jedburghs enjoyed a comfortable stay at this farm, whose owners were Monsieur and Madame Rochet. [photo page 84]. It was well hidden from the road by a stand of woods and there were many fish ponds and marshes all around. Major Parkinson and Commandant Vermeulen took up residence in a bedroom on the ground floor of the farmhouse. The W/T operator, Sergeant Loosmore, and the American pilot established themselves in the loft of the house, where they employed the radio, keeping the aerial up only during the scheduled time. The pilot assisted the team by working the generator and performing numerous other helpful tasks. Major Parkinson reported that the two daughters of Mr. Alec Balfour, who lived in the area and supported the resistance, regularly visited the Jedburghs and served as a liaison

between the team and the local Maquis. Mr. Balfour's daughters were able to travel across the countryside by horseback, on foot, or by cycle without causing suspicion. They assisted the Maquis on numerous occasions. During team Andy's stay at La Trillaudiere, they received several visitors, including "Ellipse", "Croc", and Legrand and Crawshay of Jedburgh team Hugh.⁷ [photo page 83]


The close encounter with the Germans occurred on 20 July when team Andy heard machinegun fire from the direction of La Gabriere. Later, they learned that the gunfire came from a German firefight with the resistance, in which the Germans killed Prince Joachim Murat⁸ and his driver. [photo page 84] Major Parkinson reported that the death of Prince Murat was a great blow to them all. For the Prince had provided great care for the Jedburghs and had been in charge of the convoys that had earlier transported the team. Upon hearing the firing, the Jedburghs quickly gathered their equipment and vacated the farm for a nearby swamp. They stayed there for ten hours before returning to the farm, although leaving their equipment in the swamp to avoid compromising the farmer and his wife if the Germans should return. Fortunately for the team, the Germans abandoned their search before reaching the farm.⁹

On 27 July Major Parkinson, Commandant Vermeulen, and the American pilot travelled three hours by car to the Le Blanc airfield, where they waited for the Hudson operation


(same concept as the Dakota operation, but different aircraft). Sergeant Loosmore stayed at the farm for the next two weeks. He visited team Hugh on 12 August, and became part of Jedburgh team Ivor on 14 August. At 0135 hours of 28 July the plane left France after a seven minute stay on the ground. The return trip to London was uneventful and took slightly more than three hours.¹⁰

"CONCLUSION"- TEAM ANDY"

Team Andy was unable to accomplish its mission because of physical injuries sustained during their parachute drop. Fortunately, the reception committee was able to care for the injured Jedburghs and move them to several safe areas during team Andy's ten days in France. Team Andy's radio operator eventually linked up with team Ivor, which lost its radio operator during its parachute drop.



Photograph 1. Team Andy's safehouse "La Trillaudiere"



Photograph 2. Monument to Prince Joachim Murat near La Gabriere

CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

The members of team Andy had operational code names as well as their true names. The French members usually had a nom de guerre. Listed below is some personal information on the team members.

True name: Major R.A. Parkinson
Code name: FIFE
Nationality: British

Promoted to Major while in France. Major Parkinson received notice of his promotion to Major via a SFHQ transmission to the team on 18 July.

True name: Commandant J. Vermeulen
Code name: CARLOW
nom de guerre: None.
Nationality: French

True name: Sergeant Glyn Loosmore
Code name: LUNDY
Nationality: British

Mr. Loosmore currently resides in Leicester, United Kingdom. Following his mission to France, he joined Force 136, which operated in Burma against the Japanese. In a group of about six Europeans and 20 Burmese, he participated in interdicting the railway between Rangoon and Moulmein. When the war ended he was preparing to drop into Malaya. Sergeant Loosmore demobilized in January 1947 and returned to the United Kingdom where he attended Swansea University. Upon graduation from Swansea University, Mr. Loosmore joined the Colonial Administrative Service and spent several tours in Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. Returning to the United Kingdom in 1963, he soon began teaching at Leicester University until he retired in 1983. Mr. Loosmore is married and has two children. He returned to his operational area in France many times and remains friends with the family that hosted him while with team Ivor.

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 4: 461.

" Ibid., 452, 454.

" Glyn Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991.

" Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 463.

" Ibid., 463, 464, 662.

" Ibid., 464, 465; Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991. The town of La Gabriere is incorrectly spelled " St. Gabriello" in Mendelsohn's Covert Warfare, Volume 4. Additionally, Sergeant Loosmore's name is often misspelled, "Loosemore".

" Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 465.

" Ibid., 466, 467; M.R.D. Foot, SOE In France An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-44 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968), 132, 133. Prince Murat was from the house of Murat, a descendant of Napoleon's sister Caroline and Joachim Murat (1767-1815) born near Cahors, France. Marshal of France 1804, and King of Naples 1808. Foot records that Prince Murat "... was killed alongside a Jedburgh team near his home in the Dordogne" and references "SOE file Andy". The Prince may have been from the Dordogne department, but he was killed near the village of La Gabriere as accounted in Mendelsohn's Covert Warfare and Loosmore's letter to the author accompanied with photos of the Prince's monument near La Gabriere.

" Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 466, 467.

¹⁰ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 467, 640, 662.

CHAPTER SIX

TEAM IVOR

Team Ivor was the twenty-first Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom. The team deployed on the night of 6/7 August just south of St. Amand in the Cher department. This team comprised of members from Britain, France, and the United States. The team leader was British Captain John H. Cox, the French member was Lieutenant Robert Colin, and the American radio operator was First Sergeant Lewis F. Goddard.²

Jedburgh team Hamish had earlier requested additional assistance to develop the southern Cher department. Consequently, team Ivor received instructions from SFHQ to organize, assist, and supply the St. Amand Maquis. Specifically, the team would contact the DMR of their area, "Ellipse", organize the resistance into units of 100 men or less, identify drop zones, report on the organization, strength, and arms of the Maquis, and contact team Hamish to determine the areas of responsibility. Although team Ivor was to work closely with team Hamish, they would report to SFHQ for command and control.³

Team Ivor's infiltration did not go well. Sergeant Goddard died during the parachute drop, when his parachute failed to open. The Jedburghs buried him later that day in the Beddes village cemetery, with full military honors. The team missed drop zone "Paris" near Beddes, landing in a nearby gravel pit. [map page 107] According to Jedburgh team Hamish, team Ivor's personnel left the aircraft after it had already passed the drop zone. This happened because the men and their containers exited the aircraft on the same pass, the men following the equipment. The drop zone was not long enough to accommodate men and containers on the same pass. Team Hamish also noted that drops should not occur under 600 feet, which may indicate that the aircraft was too low for the drop.³

The remaining two Jedburghs sustained injuries later that night while walking through the gravel pit. Uncertain of who would meet them in the darkness, Lieutenant Colin carried his revolver at the ready. Unfortunately, he stumbled in a hole and accidentally shot himself in the leg. Captain Cox also stumbled in a hole and sprained his foot. Fortunately, team Hamish had a doctor in its Maquis group, who treated the two injured Jedburghs. These injuries restricted their movement, thus, slowing down their initial contacts with the Maquis.⁴

Team Ivor established its first headquarters in the Chateau at Frappon close to Saulzias on 8 August. From there

they worked with the Maquis, whose targets were the German lines of communications between Montlucon and Bourges. The next headquarters for team Ivor was in the Chateau Torchefoulon in Verneuil-les-Bois, a small and remote village. The team reported on 15 August that the partisans maintained continuous pressure against the railway between Montlucon - St. Amand - Bourges, Bourges - Issoudun, and Bourges - La Guerche. Team Ivor received additional tasking on 15 and 19 August. SFHQ instructed team Ivor to, stop or retard the German 159th Division from moving north, continue guerrilla warfare against German lines of communications, and when Allied forces enter Ivor's area, contact the special forces staff and give the password Jeanne D' Arc.^a

The German withdrawal routes from southwestern France determined the engagement areas for the resistance forces south of the Loire River. Team Ivor reported that the German's major withdrawal route passed between the towns of Bourges on the north and St. Amand to the south. Within this corridor passed three main axis. They were:

1. North. Chateauroux - Issoudun - Chareost - St Florent - Bourges. Here the enemy would halt and rest, to continue on 3 routes:

- a. Bourges - Sansergues - La Charite.
- b. Bourges - Nerondes - La Guerche - Nevers.
- c. Bourges - Blet - Sancoins - St Pierre Le Moutier.

2. Center. The least used. Issoudun - Chateaufort - Dun Sur Auron - Blet - Sancoins - St Pierre.

3. South - Chateauroux - Lignerres - St. Amand - Charenton - Sancoins. The enemy used St. Amand as a resting place.*

The Germans rarely travelled on the smaller roads, keeping to the main roads. The Germans used all three axis simultaneously only twice. The majority of their forces withdrew along these routes between 20 August and 14 September.⁷

When team Ivor entered the south Cher, the enemy was too weak and scattered to significantly hinder the team's movement. With some caution, the team was able to travel by car throughout the rural areas. The Germans occupied the towns of Bourges, Vierzon, La Guerche as well as the Avord airfield, the Nerondes tunnel, and a radio interception post at Bannegon. The Milice had garrisons at St. Florent, Sancoins and St. Amand. The team reported that the Milice did not travel the countryside because they feared the local population. Two reduced battalions, lacking men and arms, of the Vichy government's Premier Regiment De France guarded St. Amand and Dun-Sur-Auron. Many of these French troops sympathized with the Maquis. According to Captain Cox, most of the Premier Regiment De France's soldiers considered the duty more appealing than being transported to Germany as laborers. There were some elements within the Premier Regiment, however, that definitely supported the Nazis and posed a threat to the resistance. With the exception of the population around St. Just, which was not helpful to the

resistance according to team Ivor, the majority of the population supported the Maquis. In addition to their duties of maintaining law and order, the gendarmes were sympathetic towards the resistance, often providing the resistance information on the enemy. The PTT also supported the resistance by passing information for them."

Team Hamish introduced team Ivor to Colonel Benoit, Chief of the partisans in the southern Cher. He provided team Ivor an update on the situation, including the status of the resistance forces in the area. There were three resistance groups; Le Premier Regiment D'Infanterie, "Combat Organization", and the FTP. However, there was little liaison between them. The Premier Regiment D'Infanterie consisted of about 200 cadre members under the command of Colonel Benoit. This regiment occupied the southern Cher after the armistice, but disbanded on 20 November 1942. Some of the members had hid a sizeable part of the regiment's equipment and arms. They dispersed, but maintained their old chain of command."

The "Combat Organization" consisted of approximately 150 poorly armed and organized men of the FFI. They were under the command of Lieutenant Chaillot near the town of Culan. These forces were the remnants of a larger group commanded by "Surcouf" and Lieutenant Blanchard that on 6 June killed 20 Milicien and occupied St. Amand for two days. Unfortunately, their revolt was premature and caused the

German forces from Bourges to descend upon St. Amand. The Germans executed 40 people and set fire to ten houses in reprisal. The Maquis withdrew to the Creuse department, where they suffered many casualties. The withdrawal fragmented their chain of command, which in turn disrupted their unit integrity. The remnants of this FFI Maquis eventually returned to the southern Cher under Lieutenant Chaillot and called itself the FFI company Surcouf-Blanchard. They were very cooperative in coordinating their operations with Colonel Benoit and team Ivor. The unsuccessful revolt of 6 June basically destroyed the FFI's organization in the Cher. Consequently, the neighboring FFI organizations took it upon themselves to work in the Cher. The FFI in Indre annexed most of the region west of the River Cher.¹⁰

The Cher FTP was under the command of Captain Hubert and consisted of approximately 500 men dispersed in the western Cher. Like the "Combat Organization", the FTP also withdrew to the Creuse, but did not suffer the same fate as the FFI's "Combat Organization", and returned to the Cher completely intact. Team Ivor met with Captain Hubert on 13 August and requested that the FTP leader join forces with the FFI. Captain Hubert did not want to cooperate in this organization, which Colonel Benoit led, preferring to remain independent. After discussing the general situation, however, Captain Hubert agreed to unite with the FFI against

the Germans and coordinate his military operations with Colonel Benoit. Team Ivor reported that the liaison with Hubert remained good.¹¹

In regards to the Premier Regiment De France, the Jedburghs and Colonel Benoit met with the commanders of two battalions, Lieutenant Colonels Aublet and Ardisson on 13 August, which was a very busy day for team Ivor. The purpose of the meeting was to persuade the two battalions to switch sides and join the resistance. As a precautionary measure, Colonel Benoit insisted that the pro-Nazi elements within the regiment be arrested. At first, Lieutenant Colonels Aublet and Ardisson rejected an outright and immediate defection, but offered to join the resistance if they could retain command of their battalions, and when the Miliciens and the majority of the Germans withdrew. After lengthy discussions with the two colonels, they reached an agreement. The colonels agreed to supply certain arms and ammunition to the Maquis, allow free passage for the Maquis through the towns of St. Amand and Dun-Sur-Auron, and maintain a neutral attitude toward the Maquis. However, the two battalions soon joined forces with the resistance.¹²

Maquis' command and control problems created coordination trouble for team Ivor and the newly incorporated Premeir Regiment De France. An armed element from the east Indre, under command of Colonel Robert and supported by Jedburgh team Hamish, encircled a battalion of the Premier

Regiment De France at Dun-Sur-Auron. Colonel Robert planned to disarm the battalion and relocate the troops to the east Indre. The battalion did not submit to Colonel Robert's demand, so the Indre group withdrew. This total lack of coordination between the FFI disturbed Lieutenant Colonel Aublet immensely and almost caused his immediate withdrawal from the tenuous alliance made earlier with team Ivor and Colonel Benoit. Because of the seriousness of the problem, the team and Colonel Benoit drove 60 kilometers to Colonel Robert's headquarters in Crevan. Unable to resolve the issue at this meeting, the team, Colonels Benoit and Robert drove to Le Blanc to confer with Jedburgh team Hugh and "Surcouf". Team Hugh and "Surcouf" solved the problem. Colonel Robert's forces would not disturb the Premier Regiment De France battalions in the Cher, but some sapper elements from this regiment would move to the Indre and assist the FFI in attacking Chateauroux.¹³

Lieutenant Colonel Aublet eventually acted against the Maquis on 22 August, when he ordered elements of his command to return to St. Amand and Dun-Sur-Auron. He also arrested two officers who were in liaison with the Maquis. Prior to this order his forces supported the Maquis and ambushed German convoys. Not wasting any time, Colonel Benoit ordered the Premier Regiment De France surrounded and the arrest of Colonels Aublet, Ardisson and pro-Nazi elements within the unit.¹⁴

By 20 August the Maquis were gaining strength and attacking withdrawing German convoys along the three main routes between Bourges and St. Amand. Colonel Benoit's Premier Regiment D'Infanterie's cadre mobilized 1,200 troops into ten companies, armed with light machineguns, Brens, and rifles. The soldiers retrieved most of these weapons from the caches they emplaced back in November, 1942. Their morale was excellent. The 33rd Demibrigade, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Trousseau, consisted of split-up units from the recently converted Regiment De France. This unit consisted of 500 men, 250 rifles, and 20 light machineguns. The company "FFI Surcouf" fielded 150 men with ten light machineguns, and 80 rifles or Stens. Finally, the FTP under command of Captain Hubert grew to about 1,200 troops who were adequately armed. Their name became the Regiment Populaire Berrichon and included all FTP elements in Cher.¹⁰

In late August and early September team Ivor was in contact with numerous other Allied organizations in and around the Cher. The team made contact with agent "Le Contre" of the French Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (BCRAM) on 25 August. agent operated a radio set for BCRAM, and offered to assist Ivor as necessary. Sergeant Loosmore now operated team Ivor's radio, so agent "Le Contre" was not used. Team Ivor's Maquis intercepted a convoy of seven cars carrying a British officer, his radio operator, and a group of French saboteurs travelling from

Tarbes to Paris. Questioned by Captain Cox, the British officer identified himself as either agent "Lionel" or "Edouard" and established his bona fides. Captain Cox allowed the group to pass, once convinced by the British officer of the group's legitimacy. Captain Cox, however, queried SFHQ about the group and received assurance the following day that the British officer was indeed an Allied agent on a special mission. A Lieutenant Davidson of the First SAS met the Jedburghs on 1 September and informed the team that some French SAS groups were around Bourges.^{1*}

Captain Cox again travelled to Le Blanc in search of weapons for Colonel Benoit's Maquis. But this time he travelled more cautiously, because of the large number of German troops on the main roads. While there, he met with Lieutenant Colonel Obolensky of Operations Group Patrick to request his assistance in the Cher. Operations Group Patrick did not move to the Cher, but stayed in the Indre, because Lieutenant Colonel Obolensky believed his group's presence there was more important. Team Ivor also contacted the inter-allied mission "Bergamotte", a six man mission, and Jedburgh team James, which had completed their missions in the Creuse and Correze respectively. These two groups proposed to come north and assist the Jedburghs in the Cher. Colonel Benoit commented that there was no need for additional troops in his area, but reiterated his need for arms. Lieutenant Colin accompanied one of Colonel Benoit's

officers to Orleans on 4 September where they met with Colonel Bourgois of the 4th French Parachute Battalion, who considered his own mission completed in the north Cher and agreed to assist team Ivor in the southern Cher. While in Orleans, Lieutenant Colin also saw Lieutenant Bordes, the French member of Jedburgh team Alec, who was recovering from serious wounds received during a recent ambush. The 4th French Parachute Battalion moved to the south of Bourges to assist team Ivor and Colonel Benoit. Further contact with team Alec resulted in the receipt of arms for Ivor's Maquis in Bourges on 9 September.¹⁷

The resistance groups team Ivor encountered needed little organizational assistance, but did require arms and ammunition. The greatest problem the team encountered was convincing SFHQ to send them arms and ammunition. The seriousness of the situation can be seen by the message traffic between the team and SFHQ. Jedburgh team Andy's radio operator, Sergeant Locsmore, joined team Ivor in mid August and replaced the Ivor schedule with the Andy schedule soon thereafter. Team Ivor used the Andy schedule because the frequencies and contact times of Andy's schedule were more convenient to use than Ivor's. The message traffic follows:

11 August from Ivor: Send arms and money immediately. Delay affecting morale.

17 August from Ivor: Our lack of arms extremely serious. For God's sake speed up dispatch.

22 August from Ivor: Excellent day of ambushes. Much damage done, but work must end due to lack of ammo and arms.

26 August from Andy: Why don't you say something. You give us no information, no arms, nothing. We might as well burn our radio. Column after column of Joche pass under our nose but incapable of hitting them. Very bad for morale and your name stinks with the French and us.

27 August from SFHQ: Do not think we have abandoned you. You can expect aerial bombardments daily on escaping German columns...make arrangement with Hugh via Hamish for weapons...

30 August from SFHQ: Cannot send any more parachutages as all aircraft being used for northern France...make arrangements with Hugh for part of the stores.^{1*}

Team Ivor reportedly kept SFHQ informed on the presence of German convoys for aerial bombardment. Ivor estimated that 150,000 Germans passed through their area between 20 August and 15 September. Although SFHQ informed the team that aerial bombardment would occur, team Ivor reported that they observed very few air strikes. According to the team, the only time Allied aircraft achieved any results was when three Lightnings attacked FTP lorries killing 20 and wounding 30 men. The lorries were even marked with white stars to avoid such attacks by Allied aircraft.^{1*}

Other problems encountered by team Ivor included contacting "Ellipse", W/T communications with SFHQ, timely and accurate support from SFHQ, and movement. It took about two weeks to make contact with "Ellipse", who was always on the move working with the resistance forces throughout the region. With Sergeant Goddard dead, the team could not

use its radio effectively, which hampered communications between SFHQ and team Ivor. Until a W/T operator could be found, Captain Cox and Lieutenant Colin encoded and sent the routine messages, but relied on team Hamish to transmit important messages. Fortunately, Sergeant Loonsmore, from the casualty ridden Jedburgh team Andy, linked up with team Ivor to perform the W/T duties. Team Ivor reported that at times SFHQ had difficulties understanding the situation in France. For example, on one occasion the team queried SFHQ about the Allier (meaning the Allier River) and received a return question as to who is Allier. SFHQ responded to the team's request for decisions by passing the decision to "Ellipse", who was very hard to locate at times, thus precluding a timely decision. Regarding the arms issue, SFHQ instructed team Ivor to coordinate with team Hugh to receive arms scheduled to arrive in Hugh's area. It was very difficult, however, for the Jedburghs to move from Saulzais to Le Blanc, when the bulk of the Germans were passing through the area.²⁰

Team Ivor reported several engagements with the enemy between 20 August and 15 September. The most brutal of these occurred on 24 August, when a company of Maquis attacked the town of Avord, only to find it strongly defended by the Germans. Failing to dislodge the Germans, the Maquis company withdrew, but left some wounded behind. The Germans caught the wounded Maquis, and killed and mutilated them. The Maquis retaliated by executing an equal number of German

prisoners and returning their bodies to the Germans. On each body was a note stating that for each Maquis prisoner killed, the same would be done to German prisoners. Other engagements took place at St. Just and St. Amand. The Maquis attacked a convoy departing St. Amand, destroying ten vehicles and capturing 30 Germans. In addition to these specific engagements, team Ivor reported that the Maquis conducted both day and night road ambushes continuously between 20 August and 15 September along the withdrawal routes between Bourges and St. Amand. Team Ivor reported attacks against the railroad lines servicing Montlucon on 15 August.²¹

The climax of German passage through team Ivor's area occurred around 2 September. The Jedburghs reported the difficulty in moving by car through the southern Cher because of the large number of Germans on the highways. The Germans began to attack the Maquis during this period, once coming within 500 meters of Colonel Benoit's command post. During this period many Hindus, members of the German army's Regiment 950, also known as the "Free Indian Regiment", burned houses and farms, raped and killed civilians as the convoys passed through.²²

On 11 September Colonel Benoit ordered a cease fire to facilitate the surrender of the last large German convoy to enter the Cher. Approximately 20,000 Germans were spread out along three routes with the vanguard across the Allier

River just east of Sancoins, the center between Dun and Blet, and the rearguard in Chateauneuf. Colonel Martel, chief of FFI Indre, was instrumental in coordinating the surrender of this German convoy, through his contact with the convoy commander, General Elster. General Elster met American Major General Robert C. Macon, Commander, 83rd Infantry Division, at Issoudun on 10 September, where they negotiated the details of the surrender.²³

Unfortunately, the details of surrender were not known to team Ivor and Colonel Benoit of the Cher, because the surrender negotiations took place in the Indre. To clarify the surrender issue, Colonel Benoit quickly telephoned Colonel Martel to find out the details. According to the surrender agreement, the Germans were to retain their weapons and move north at midnight, 12 September toward the Loire River. Team Ivor, Colonel Benoit, a representative of the U.S. Ninth Army's commander, and others met with General Elster at Arcay on 11 September to discuss the German's movement through the Cher. Items of discussion included: time and method of informing the resistance forces and German forces of the cease fire, prohibiting any contact with civilians and towns by the Germans, and feeding and caring for wounded Germans by the Americans. Because of the time required to notify all parties involved, the movement north began at night, 13 September, 24 hours later than originally planned.²⁴

Team Ivor criticized the surrender terms the Americans made with General Elster. Under the terms of surrender, the Germans were allowed to retain their weapons and transport while moving towards the Loire River. The team's greatest concern was the exposure of the unarmed civilian population to possible German atrocities on their march north. Allegedly, the Germans killed three Frenchmen during the convoy's move north. However, other accounts indicate that the movement through the Cher and adjoining Loir et Cher departments went well, except for several minor incidents. According to the terms of surrender, General Elster was to officially surrender to General Macon on 17 September at Beaugency, just north of the Loire River.™

With the departure of the Germans on 13 September, St. Amand held liberation ceremonies that day. With St. Amand liberated, team Ivor's mission was complete. They drove to Paris with Colonel Benoit, where the team reported to the special forces detachment at the Cecil Hotel. Instructed to return in three or four days, the team returned to Bourges, where they were informed by SFHQ to go and organize an attack on La Rochelle. The distance and lack of transportation precluded team Ivor from moving any of their Maquis to the coast. On 18 September the team accompanied their Maquis to Orleans where General De Gaulle reviewed the Maquis units. Captain Cox requested permission from SFHQ to join his regiment, immediately, which was refused. All

Jedburgh members were to report to London prior to reassignment. Notified to return to London, team Ivor travelled to Paris on 21 September and returned to London on 23 September where they reported to staff at Bryanston Square. "•

"TEAM IVOR - CONCLUSION"

Jedburgh team Ivor did not complete its primary mission as assigned by SFHQ, to organize and supply the resistance forces around St. Amand in the south Cher. This failure was not team Ivor's fault, because SFHQ did not provide the equipment to supply the Maquis, and the Maquis were already organized when the team arrived. Team Ivor did however accomplish the additional tasks assigned by SFHQ.

SFHQ did not provide adequate supplies to team Ivor. The team reported that SFHQ promised all the arms and materials the team requested, but in practice delivered very little. Only five aircraft dropped material to the team, which stated they could have armed 5,000 Maquis. One of the five aircraft dropped just one package, while the remaining four aircraft dropped mostly stens and medical supplies. Team Ivor reported that SFHQ might as well have sent them knitting needles. The team was very displeased with SFHQ's resupply effort. "•

To make up for this lack of support from SFHQ, team Ivor resorted to begging arms from other, more fortunate, resistance groups around them. Fortunately, the Premiere Regiment d'Infanterie hid their arms and equipment in late 1942, thus enabling them to recover the material and initially sustain their own operations. The team received arms from Jedburgh team Hamish and the resistance battalion Dubreuil in east Indre. Team Ivor's credibility as an arms supplier must have been very low among the resistance groups.**

Colonel Benoit and the other Maquis leaders around St. Amand had organized the resistance quite well by the time Team Ivor arrived. Consequently, there was little organizing for the team to do. Team Ivor did, however, provide liaison between their region, SFHQ, and adjoining regions.**

With respect to the additional tasks assigned, the team accomplished all of them except for one, impeding the German 159th Division's movement north. It is no longer possible to determine whether or not the 159th moved through Ivor's region or if Ivor's Maquis attacked the division. It is very likely, however, that team Ivor's Maquis did engage the 159th Infantry Division, since that division was part of the 64th Corps moving through the Cher in late August and early September. The team made contact with "Ellipse", although it took longer than expected because of his travelling. They also reported dropping grounds to SFHQ,

coordinated with team Hamish for the division of responsibilities in the region, reported the status of the resistance groups, and maintained pressure on the withdrawing convoys through the use of road ambushes.³⁰

Team Ivor reported numerous enemy casualties between 20 August and 18 September. The alleged damage to the enemy included 75 vehicles destroyed, 500 enemy confirmed killed, with an estimated 15,000 killed in all, and 250 enemy taken prisoner. The estimated 15,000 killed appears far too high for a withdrawing force of 100,000, which is what the 64th Corps is reported to have had in August, 1944. A loss rate of 15 percent killed is extremely high considering conventional battle loss statistics from World War II. According to statistical battle loss convention, an infantry division will sustain ten percent battle losses per month in a combat zone. Of these losses, 16.5 percent are killed, 13.5 percent are captured or missing, and 70 percent are wounded. Applying these statistics factors to the 100,000 man 64th Corps would project a loss of 1,650 killed, 1,350 Captured/missing, and 7,000 wounded. Considering even 1,650 Germans killed, the Maquis inflicted significant casualties on the withdrawing enemy.³¹

In summary, team Ivor spent about one and one half months in the south Cher assisting a well-organized Maquis. The team was deeply disappointed that SFHQ did not support them during their mission. SFHQ's failure to adequately

supply the Maquis severely tested the resistance's morale and faith in the Jedburghs. The team criticised SFHQ for not assisting them. For example, the team queried SFHQ for information on enemy troop movements outside the team's area of operation, but did not receive anything. Failure of SFHQ to provide this kind of information implies a lack of centralized collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence. It is also possible the intelligence was available, but not communicated for some unexplained reason. In either case, the failure of SFHQ to provide the support team Ivor believed was due it, resulted in a successful, yet disappointed Jedburgh team Ivor.**



Map 6. St. Amand area

(1" = 4 miles)

* Beddes * Dun-sur-Auron * Lemet * Arcay

CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES

The members of team Ivor had operational code names as well as their true names. The French members usually had a nom de guerre. Listed below is some personal information on the team members.

True name: Captain John H. Cox
Code name: MONMOUTH
Nationality: British

Mr. Cox presently lives in Surrey, United Kingdom. Based on his letter to the author on 23 January 1991, Mr. Cox stated that after his mission to France, he participated in a "Jedburgh like" job in Burma. Prior to the war Mr. Cox studied in France.

True name: Lieutenant Robert Colin
Code name: SELUNE
nom de guerre: Lieutenant Y.M. Dantec
Nationality: French

Lieutenant Colin reportedly stayed in the French Army and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel.

True name: 1st Sergeant L.F. Goddard
Code name: OREGON
Nationality: American

The W/T operator for team Ivor. Sergeant Lewis Goddard died during the parachute drop early in the morning of 6 June, 1944. Teams Ivor and Hamish buried him in the Beddes village cemetery with full military honors on 7 August 1944.

True name: Sergeant Glyn Loosmore
Code name: LUNDY
Nationality: British

Sergeant Loosmore joined team Ivor on 14 August to replace Sergeant Goddard as the W/T operator. See chapter 5, Team Andy, endnotes for information on Sergeant Loosmore.

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 4: 629.

² Ibid., 629, 630, 633. On 17 August team Ivor reported finding several carrier pigeons that had been dropped by parachute from RAF aircraft. Accompanying the pigeons was a message demanding information on the German dispositions. The team queried SFHQ about the pigeons and was informed that the team could use the pigeons if desired. No further information is available on the team's use of the pigeons.

³ Ibid., 631, 635; Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 271, 272, 290. Lieutenant Anstett, the leader of Jedburgh team Hamish, nailed one of Goddard's identification tags to the inside of the coffin and retained Goddard's personal effects. Sergeant Goddard's body was later returned to the United States.

⁴ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 635, 640.

⁵ Ibid., 632, 633. Glyn Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991. Chateau Torchefoulon was one of the safehouses occupied by team Ivor. This chateau was large, with about 17 rooms, and hidden by a woods from the road. Mr. Loosmore returned numerous time after the war to visit the chateau and the people who befriended him.

⁶ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 647.

⁷ Ibid., 647, 654.

⁸ Ibid., 638, 639; Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991.

⁹ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 636; Loosmore, letter to author, 17 March 1991.

¹⁰ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 637.

¹¹ Ibid., 641. During the meeting between team Ivor and Captain Hubert, another FTP leader from the region of Vierzon attended. His name was Renandin. No further information is available on Renandin.

¹² Ibid., 642, 649.

¹³ Ibid., 643, 644, 649.

¹⁴ Ibid., 649.

¹⁸ Ibid., 645, 646.

¹⁹ Ibid., 649, 650; John Strawson, A History of the SAS Regiment (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 271, 272. The SAS mission represented by Lieutenant Davidson may have been one of two SAS missions in the region. Mission "Newton", which operated in the Champagne/Burgundy area from 19 August to 11 September, 1944, consisted of elements from the 1st SAS and 3rd French Para Battalion. The mission's complement was 57 troops and 19 Jeeps. Their mission was to harass the enemy withdrawal. They reported to have worked with the FFI. The other possible SAS mission was "Spencer", which operated east of Bourges from 29 August to 14 September, 1944. Mission "Spencer" consisted of the 4th French Parachute Battalion, with 317 troops and 54 Jeeps. "Spencer's" mission was to act as a mobile harassing force to interdict the withdrawing enemy from southwestern France across the Loire River. The mission reported to have seriously disrupted the enemy's crossing of the Loire River and contributed to the capture of 20,000 German troops. The 20,000 German troop surrender refers to General Elster's surrender to the American 83rd Division.

²⁰ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 651-653, 760. No further information is available on the employment of team James's Maquis or mission "Bergamotte" other than they intended to enter the Indre and Cher to attack the Germans. Team James briefed its Maquis, which had moved to the town of Gueret, as to the enemy routes of withdrawal in Indre and Cher. Confident of the Maquis' ability, and with the approval of "Ellipse", team James returned to London with the idea of forming a mobile unit for attacking the German columns. The leader of team James was American First Lieutenant John K. Singlaub; Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 5: 88. According to Operations Group Patrick, they were informed by SFHQ to terminate their mission to Eguzon, and place their group under the direction of the FFI in Indre or of Captain Cox of Jedburgh team Ivor. Lieutenant Colonel Obelensky chose to stay in the Indre by moving to the Le Blanc area, which was within striking distance of Eguzon. He stayed because of his familiarity with the Le Blanc area and because Colonel Roland of the FTP requested that the Operations Group stay at Eguzon, fearing a return of the Germans; M.R.D. Foot, SOE In France An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-44 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), 395, 396, 403. Quoting from page 395, a quote itself attributed to "an SOE file", provides a first hand description of a Maquis ambush as described by the second-in-command of the "Bergamotte" mission: "...in a few minutes an unending stream of armoured cars, motorcars, motorcyclists, lorries, and occasional tanks appeared. They all seemed to be in slight disorder and were

in no particular formation; private cars could be seen with troop-laden lorries on each side of them, and motorcyclists appeared at irregular intervals. The speed of advance was extremely slow - about 5 miles an hour - and there were frequent halts to remove a tree trunk, investigate a supposed trap, or reconnoiter the roadside. All this was a sure proof - if we needed one - that the maquis guerillas were feared, and were succeeding in their main intention of delaying the enemy. The troops we saw were both German infantry and miliciens..."; Strawson, A History of the SAS Regiment, 272. Colonel Bourgois was the commander of mission "Spenser". See endnote 16 for information on mission "Spenser".

10 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 632-640, 456, 457.

10 Ibid., 657, 658.

10 Ibid., 640, 641, 651, 658.

11 Ibid., 632, 647-649.

11 Ibid., 458, 651.

11 Ibid., 654, 729-735.

11 Ibid., 654, 656, 729-735.

11 Ibid., 660, 735; Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 3: 278.

11 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 656.

11 Ibid., 659.

11 Ibid., 650.

11 Ibid., 660.

10 Ibid., 633; Kurt Schuster, "The LXIV Army Corps in the Period from August to November 1944", A-885: 2.

11 Mendelsohn, Covert War, 4: 659; U.S. Army, FM 101-10-1/2 Staff Officer's Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Volume 2), (Washington: Department of the Army, 1987) 4-11.

11 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 658.

CHAPTER SEVEN

TEAM ALEC

The twenty-second Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom was team Alec. The team leader was American First Lieutenant George C. Thomson, the French member was Lieutenant A Bordes, and the radio operator was American Staff Sergeant John A. White. Team Alec parachuted into the northern Cher Department during the night of 9/10 August, 1944. Here they successfully worked with the Maquis for the next month and a half, until SPHQ considered the mission complete on 17 September and instructed the team to return to England.¹

The primary mission of team Alec was to accompany a SAS reconnaissance party from the First SAS Regiment into the Loir et Cher and serve as a link between the SAS and the resistance groups. Additionally, team Alec would work under the control of "Antoine", the leader of F section's VENTRILOQUIST circuit. Team Alec apparently spent most of its time working for "Antoine" by organizing and arming the FFI. They never reported on the SAS, except for a 24 August report that the SAS and Maquis had cut a railroad line between Bourges and Nevers, thus immobilizing a German armored train for three days.²

The purpose of the SAS reconnaissance party was to determine the feasibility of employing up to one-half a squadron of the First SAS Regiment to interdict the railway lines between Vierzon - Orleans and Vierzon - Tours. In addition, the SAS were to report on enemy movements. The reconnaissance must have gone well, because "Antoine", using team Alec's radio, reported on 13 August the arrival of "20 SAS Haggard" and requested 40 more.³

Prior to departure for France, team Alec received a mission briefing which included the enemy order of battle, topography of the area, and a general outline of the resistance organizations in the Loir et Cher department. The team and eight members of the SAS reconnaissance party dropped 60 miles east of their intended drop zone and ended up in the northern part of the Cher department. Other than being 60 miles from their drop zone in Loir et Cher, and losing two rucksacks, the Jedburghs and SAS parachute drop was uneventful. The team contacted "Colon", chief of the Maquis Ducher on 10 August and met "Antoine" on 12 August. Since "Antoine" employed the Jedburgh team in the northern Cher, and SFHQ agreed to their new location, the Jedburghs remained. At least some of the SAS also remained through 24 August.⁴

Team Alec's area of operations covered the area between the Loire River to the north and east, the railroad line between Nevers and Vierzon to the south and the railroad

line between Vierzon and Orleans to the west. Similar to the other Jedburgh teams in this paper, team Alec's Maquis engagement areas followed the German 64th Corps' withdrawal routes from the southwestern France towards Germany. The major routes running east through the northern Cher had only two Loire River crossing sites, La Charite and Nevers. The Maquis concentrated its ambushes on the road and rail networks leading towards the two river crossing sites. When team Alec entered this area, the German's withdrawal from southwestern France was just beginning. Team Alec reported on 14 August the presence of various German units throughout the entire bend of the Loire River; all appeared to be lost, searching for crossings over the Loire River, and detached from the bulk of the forces withdrawing east."

By 18 August the Jedburghs reported the first of several mass movements of Germans passing through the Cher. Approximately 16,000 of the enemy found themselves in the northeast corner of the Loire River bend, between Orleans and Sancerre. Realizing the river crossing points were further south and the American Ninth Army just north of their position, they turned south and headed towards Bourges. The only reported Loire River bridges still passable were in La Charite and Nevers, both held by the Germans. The Maquis held the bridge in Sancerre, but eventually destroyed it on 1 September per instructions from SFHQ. The team reported that the Germans were not well armed and were travelling by all

means of transport: by foot, bicycle, and horse drawn vehicles. The Maquis took advantage of the German's vulnerability by blocking and ambushing many roads leading south, which caused confusion and casualties for the enemy. Team Alec informed SFHQ on 13 August that Maquis ambushes destroyed 10 vehicles and 50 Germans.*

The team reported the status of the Maquis on 14 August as 750 armed and 1,100 unarmed men organized into four area commands. Nerondes fielded 250 armed and 250 unarmed FFI, Vierzon with 200 armed and 500 unarmed men, Bourges 150 unarmed, Sancerre with 300 armed and 200 unarmed men. The team reported they could have armed an additional 3,000 Maquis, but lacked arms. Team Alec only armed another 800, however, by 21 September. The Maquis added to their arms supply by recovering weapons from the battlefield. In all, the team reported about 2,000 armed Maquis by mid-September. Although the Jedburghs requested additional arms and ammunition, SFHQ only delivered arms for 800 Maquis, far short of what team Alec requested. Team Alec received additional arms from the American Third Army once Lieutenant Thomson established contact with its special forces detachment on 26 August.7

Once this first group of Germans departed the northern Cher around 19 August and moved towards the available river crossing sites, the Maquis relocated. Team Alec met with Colonel Benoit, Chief of the southern Cher FFI

and associate of Jedburgh team Ivor, on 21 August to coordinate the actions of the two resistance groups against the Germans in Bourges. Team Alec estimated the Germans had about 5,000 troops holding Bourges to serve as a temporary strong point to protect their evacuation route. Colonel Benoit's forces established ambushes on the three Bourges roads to Dun, Levet, and Sancoins. Team Alec's Maquis covered the other Bourges roads. The team reported that the Germans began using a few armored cars and light cannon to protect the convoys, but this did not severely hinder the Maquis. They reported an average of 50 Germans killed or captured daily during this period.*

By 25 August a second surge of German forces entered the northern Cher seeking passage east. Team Alec reported that these forces came from Orleans, Tours, Vierzon and Triande. Responding to the enemy's movement, the team rapidly transferred its Maquis from the Bourges area to the northern Cher. Focusing in northern Cher, Lieutenant Thomson crossed the Loire River at Ouzeur Sur Loire and contacted the 35th United States Infantry Division. He met with Major General Manton S. Eddy, commander of the United States Twelfth Corps, and provided the corps G-2 information about the German dispositions on the Third Army's southern flank. The Third Army's special forces detachment provided Lieutenant Thomson 17 bazookas and 500 rounds, medical supplies, and 1,000 gallons of gasoline; all vitally needed

by the Maquis. Lieutenant Thomson returned on 27 August to the northern Cher, presumably by vehicle, without incident, taking with him the supplies.*

Lieutenant Thomson returned again, 28 August, to the Third Army headquarters. Returning to his headquarters in Menetou Salon, Lieutenant Thomson had to stay in Sancerre because of Germans on the roads. While there and acting on General Patton's orders, the Maquis destroyed the Loire River bridge. Lieutenant Thomson later observed that General Patton ordered all bridges across the Loire and Allier Rivers destroyed because of the numerous German troops concentrated in the departments south and west of these Rivers. Unable to drive his car on the roads because of German columns, Lieutenant Thomson bicycled to his headquarters the following day.¹⁰

Heroism and tragedy resulted from the actions of Maquis Lieutenant Bourlier of Bourges. On 30 August he led an attack against a German convoy, capturing the lead vehicle. Realizing that his group had captured the convoy commander, a German major, along with the entire withdrawal plans for the 16th German Infantry Division, Lieutenant Bourlier drove the vehicle and its occupants to team Alec's headquarters. In doing so, Lieutenant Bourlier had to pass the entire German convoy to reach the team's headquarters. These plans were quickly transported to the G-2, Third Army. Unfortunately, the Germans captured Lieutenant Bourlier that

night. Three days later they shot him in his home town of Bourges. Lieutenant Thomson requested a posthumous decoration for Lieutenant Bourlier.¹¹

On the afternoon of 4 September Lieutenants Thomson and Bordes joined 20 Maquis and four Jeeps of the French 4th Parachute Battalion, under command of a Captain Larral, in assaulting the town of Les Aix Angillon, northeast of Bourges. [map page 124] The team reported that about 150 Germans occupied the town. The Maquis offered the Germans an opportunity to surrender, which was declined. The Allies cleared the town in one hour, suffering minimal casualties, while killing 40 Germans and capturing 18. The remainder of the Germans, however, evacuated the town and were pursued by the Allies. According to Lieutenant Thomson, the situation became very confused, as the Maquis were not trained in pursuit tactics and unable to communicate between the groups. The pursuit turned into a hide-and-seek game, with the Maquis groups randomly looking for the hiding Germans. This uncoordinated search allowed the Germans to further disperse. Lieutenant Bordes received a serious wound while accompanying one of the Maquis groups. That night the Allied group occupied the town. During the following three days, the dispersed Germans surrendered in small groups.¹²

Team Alec reported the liberation of Bourges on 7 September when the FFI entered the city, the Germans having left earlier. Lieutenant Thomson stated that the cement

runway at Bourges airfield received the attention of some 2,000 workmen repairing bomb damage. By 9 September the runway was ready to receive aircraft, which it did the following day, when four P-38 "Lightnings" arrived nearly out of fuel. Lieutenant Thomson found 10,000 gallons of useable fuel, refueled the Lightnings and allowed the aircraft to depart. On 11 September a flak damaged B-17 "Flying Fortress" landed. Repaired and refueled, the Fortress departed 36 hours later.¹³

On 9 September team Alec moved their Maquis south to assist in attacking the German column of 20,000 that Jedburgh team Ivor encountered between the Allier River, just east of Sancoins and Chateauneuf. Like team Ivor, team Alec did not know about the surrender terms this column negotiated through Colonel Martel of the Indre FFI. Since this large enemy force was in their territory, the Cher Maquis intended to attack it. Team Alec and their Maquis, however, had to revise their attack plan and accommodate the existing surrender arrangements. According to team Alec's understanding of the surrender terms, the Germans were to move north through the Cher, still fully armed, and surrender their arms to the United States Army at Orleans, Beaugeury and Mer sur Loire. Fortunately, a 24 hour delay in the German's movement provided enough time to notify the Maquis,

precluding unnecessary violence. The team reported few incidents during the movement, with the Germans reaching the surrender points on 17 September.¹⁴

On 17 September, 1944, team Alec received a message from SFHQ informing them that their mission was complete. SFHQ also instructed them to complete some departure administrative tasks. Team Alec was to contact Major Alastair Hamilton at the Hotel Cecil in Paris to arrange passage back to London. Additional tasks were to bring back a list of chief Maquis helpers and addresses for future contact, place all radio equipment in a safe place for later collection, and contact the DMR to have him take over the Jedburgh's forces. Team Alec's last transmission on 21 September to SFHQ requested medical supplies be delivered to Dr. Pierre Malgras at Bourges, who provided great service to the Maquis and was still treating Lieutenant Bordes. The following morning Lieutenant Thomson and Sergeant White left the Cher department for Paris.¹⁵

"TEAM ALEC - CONCLUSION"

Team Alec's primary mission, to provide a link between the First SAS Regiment's reconnaissance party and the local Maquis in the Loir et Cher was unsuccessful. The team's additional task, to work under the control of "Antoine", which included organizing and arming the area resistance forces was partially successful.

In the strictest sense, team Alec failed to accomplish their primary mission because they dropped in the wrong area. This precluded them from working with the resistance in the Loir et Cher. The failure, however, was not the team's, but that of the aircrew that inserted them 60 miles off target. Once the Jedburghs were on the ground, they responded very well to the situation, accomplishing their mission with the FFI in the northern Cher. The Jedburghs provided a link between the FFI and the SAS.¹⁶

Team Alec fulfilled half of its additional task of supporting "Antoine" in organizing and arming the FFI. Again, due to circumstances beyond the team's control, the resistance forces in the northern Cher were already organized when team Alec arrived in early August. The team reported that the resistance's organization had much room for improvement, especially the selection and training of its junior officers. But it was already too late for the Jedburghs to begin training a cadre of junior officers in early August. It was already time to employ the Maquis.¹⁷

Team Alec succeeded in arming portions of the resistance, but SFHQ did not support all of the arming requirements of the team. The team estimated that they could have armed 3,000 Maquis, but only received arms for 800 between 14 August and 21 September. Not receiving the arms support requested of SFHQ, team Alec solicited and received arms and supplies from the American Third Army. Had it not


been for the close proximity and support of the Third United States Army's special forces detachment, team Alec would have been in the same situation as team Ivor, which experienced a severe shortage of arms from SFHQ.^{1*}

Unlike the other five Jedburgh teams in this paper, team Alec had direct contact with an American army headquarters. This liaison benefited both the Jedburgh team and the U.S. Army. The Jedburghs received arms and supplies from the Third Army, while the army received intelligence on enemy operations south of the Loire River. The team reported that they sent any information gathered on the German positions in northern Cher directly to the Third Army instead of SFHQ in London. The team also reported enemy convoy locations directly to the Third Army for aerial bombing, which apparently provided satisfactory results for the team. The use of Allied aircraft, however, did have a negative effect on the resistance. The Jedburghs noted on 26 August that Allied aircraft strafed FFI vehicles. As a result of this incident, the team ordered all FFI vehicles to be painted with a five pointed star in a circle, and requested that SFHQ notify Allied air commands of this distinguishing mark.^{2*}

Team Alec was critical of their mission, not only in the resupply effort of SFHQ, but overall support by SFHQ and the utility of the mission. Although team Alec reported excellent technical communications with SFHQ, the team

concluded that SFHQ responses were incomplete and slow in coming. Messages were reportedly answered four to five days late or not answered at all. Subsequently, the team perceived a failure of SFHQ to support the Jedburghs and directed their attention to the Third Army. From team Alec's perspective, SFHQ lacked an interest in the team and did not have the necessary number of trained personnel coordinating the actions and support requirements of the Jedburghs in the field.²⁰

As for the utility of the mission, team Alec believed that the team should have been dispatched sooner, early June, so they could organize and train the Maquis. As it was, team Alec did very little training or organizing with the Maquis, because the team did not have the time. By mid August the German withdrawal was underway. Team Alec focused on arming, which proved to be frustrating, and coordinating the Maquis' actions.²¹



Map 7. Bourges area

(1" = 4 miles)

* les Aix Angillon

CHAPTER SEVEN

ENDNOTES

The members of team Alec had operational code names as well as their true names. The French members usually had a nom de guerre. Listed below is some personal information on the team members.

True name: First Lieutenant George C. Thomson
Code name: CROMARTHY
Nationality: American

Mr. Thomson presently lives in New York City.

True name: Lieutenant A. Bordes
Code name: OXFORD
nom de guerre: Lieutenant B. Allet
Nationality: French

He was seriously wounded in combat at Les Aix Angillon. Although not confirmed, Lieutenant Allet may have later died of his wounds.

True name: Staff Sergeant John A. White
Code name: COLORADO
Nationality: American

Mr. White presently lives in Westwood, Massachusetts.

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 4: 665.

² Ibid., 665, 672; M.R.D. Foot, SOE In France An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-44 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), 398, 463. According to Foot, Philippe de Vomécourt was the leader of F section's VENTRILOQUIST circuit. This native Frenchman was one of the few F section personnel in the field in 1941 and still in control of his circuit when the Allies

liberated his region in 1944. Philippe de Vomécourt wrote a book about his exploits, titled: Who Lived to see the Day, (Hutchinson, 1961).

* Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 665, 668, 673, 675; John Strawson, A History of the SAS Regiment (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 269. Mission "Haggard" deployed on 10 August and finished its mission on 23 September. It consisted of 54 troops and commanded by Major Lepine. Mission "Haggard" believed they should have been deployed one month earlier.

* Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 667, 668, 672.

* Ibid., 663, 672, 673.

* Ibid., 673.

* Ibid., 668, 675.

* Ibid., 674.

* Ibid., 675.

¹⁰ Ibid., 675, 676.

¹¹ Ibid., 676.

¹² Ibid., 671, 676, 677. The seriousness of Lieutenant Bordes wounds required an operation, which took place the next day. Although not confirmed, Lieutenant Bordes may have died of his wounds at a later date; Strawson, A History of the SAS Regiment, 272. Captain Larral of the French 4th Parachute Battalion was probably part of Mission "Spencer", one of the French SAS units deployed near Bourges and discussed in chapter 6, team Ivor.

¹³ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 671, 678.

¹⁴ Ibid., 672, 678, 679.

¹⁵ Ibid., 672.

¹⁶ Ibid., 667, 672.

¹⁷ Ibid., 680.

¹⁸ Ibid., 673.

¹⁹ Ibid., 669, 681. Although team Alec does not comment on the color of the stars painted on the Maquis' vehicles, team Ivor reported the paint was white.

*0 Ibid., 680,681.

*1 Ibid., 681.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Five of the six Jedburgh teams studied in this paper were effective according to the criteria established in chapter one. This criteria compared the actual mission and tasks assigned to the Jedburgh teams to what the teams actually accomplished during their mission.

The idea for the original Jedburgh project, as envisioned by British Major General Gubbins, was to parachute small groups of soldiers into German occupied Europe, with the purpose of raising and arming the civilian population to conduct guerrilla operations against the enemy's lines of communications. After 18 months of planning, a basic Jedburgh directive, dated 20 December 1943, evolved, which identified a mission for the Jedburgh teams and identified a wide variety of tasks suitable for the teams.¹

The purpose of the Jedburgh teams was to function as a strategic reserve for conducting unconventional warfare in the enemy's rear areas on or after D-day (operation OVERLORD), where resistance forces needed support. [map page 137] Additionally, the Jedburghs would conduct specific tasks as deemed necessary by the military situation. Some of these tasks included rail cutting, attacking enemy vehicles.

mining roads, disrupting communications, and liquidating enemy commands and staffs. To fulfill the Jedburgh purpose and tasks, the teams had to establish good liaison with the resistance. In addition, the Jedburgh teams had to provide suitable communications, training, and equipment to the resistance.²

The six Jedburgh team's missions proved identical in nature, consisting of five similar tasks:

- * establish contact with the local resistance
- * report the status of the resistance forces in terms of personnel, leadership, arms, and potential to SFHQ
- * organize and supply the resistance forces
- * avoid expanding the resistance force beyond what SFHQ could sustain via air drops
- * report parachute drop zones for resupply

In addition, several teams were told to sabotage specific sections of railroad lines and support SAS troops with communications and liaison with the resistance.

Team Hugh was the first Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom. It spent three and one-half months operating behind enemy lines and successfully organized, supplied, and employed approximately 9,000

Maquis, thus the team was effective. The team reported on 12 August that:

Maquis attacked Boche outpost at Chambon near Ville Dieu. Captured all 15 Germans there plus 1 cannon and heavy MG. No maquis losses. 4 or 5 similar successful incidents take place every day but we have not the time to report them.³

Team Hamish was the fifth Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom and also spent three and one-half months operating in the enemy rear areas. When the team departed France in late September 1944, they reported having 3,000 fighting men under arms and another 1,000 awaiting arms. Team Hamish accomplished its mission and associated tasks, therefore it was an effective team.⁴

Jedburgh team Ian was the sixth team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom. It continued operations in the enemy's rear area for three months and reported to have 6,000 men under arms, with another 20,000 men willing to participate had SFHQ been able to supply them. The team successfully organized resistance forces and employed the forces against the Germans through ambushes, derailling trains, disrupting German convoys (which made the convoys more vulnerable to aerial bombardment), and liberated the whole of the Charente department. Team Ian, although losing its W/T operator, Sergeant Bourgoin, accomplished its mission and tasks, and hence was also effective.⁵

Team Andy was the twelfth Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom and had the unfortunate

distinction of conducting the shortest mission of the six teams studied. Major Parkinson received a double compound fracture of the left leg and Commandant Vermeulen broke one ankle during the parachute drop. The W/T operator, Sergeant Loosmore, landed well and eventually went on to successfully operate with Jedburgh team Ivor. Team Andy was unable to perform its mission and task's, thus it was not effective."

Team Ivor was the twenty-first Jedburgh team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom and operated in the enemy's rear area for one and one-half months. First Sergeant Goddard, the W/T operator, died when his parachute failed to open. Fortunately, team Ivor was able to obtain Sergeant Loosmore, from the ill fated team Andy, to conduct the W/T operations for the team. Although unable to accomplish its mission because SFHQ failed to provide equipment drops for the team, they accomplished other tasks, thus the team was effective."

Team Ivor was instrumental in maintaining communications between SFHQ and the resistance, which conferred legitimacy to the resistance. According to a former lieutenant in the Premier Regiment D' Infanterie (who subsequently commanded the regiment): "... the greatest contribution of the Jed teams was to confer legitimacy, and all that went with it, on the Resistance." This concept of

legitimacy is further explained by former Sergeant Loosmore of teams Andy and Ivor, when he observed:

Before we (Jedburghs) came they knew that the Germans saw them as terrorists and their own Government condemned them as disloyal trouble-makers. When we (Jedburghs) arrived the FFI could claim to be part of the Allied armies, operating under directions from the Allied High Command.*

Jedburgh team Alec was the twenty-second team dispatched to France from the United Kingdom and operated in the German rear areas for one and one-half months, successfully accomplishing its mission and tasks. Although instructed to work in the Loir et Cher department, the team dropped into the Cher department. This error occurred when the aircrew inserted the Jedburgh team 60 miles from its intended area. Regardless, team Alec took the initiative to carry on its tasks in the Cher department and was successful. Team Alec was instrumental in coordinating resistance activities with the U.S. Third Army, providing limited arms to the resistance, and maintaining communications between the resistance and SFHQ. Team Alec was an effective team.¹⁰

The six Jedburgh teams studied in this paper contributed to the original intent of the Jedburgh project. That intent was to conduct guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear area, with the purpose of reducing the enemy's combat effectiveness. The presence of Allied soldiers supporting resistance forces in the German rear areas created

problems for the Germans. The German commanders had to divert scarce resources to counter the "terrorists", as the Germans called the resistance.

Was the developing doctrine of the Jedburgh project valid? According to current special operations doctrine of the 1990s, the Jedburgh project doctrine was valid. Therefore, any lessons learned from the Jedburgh's operations, given similar conditions, should apply to today's special operations forces.

FM 100-25 (final draft) states:

SOF (special operations forces) can support conventional military operations at all levels of war, influencing deep, close, and rear operations. Their optimal use is in deep operations at the strategic or operational level. The impact of these deep operations is often felt throughout the theater of war.¹¹

The Jedburghs were strategic assets used in deep operations. That is, the Jedburghs conducted their missions well behind the enemy front lines and targeted the enemy's infrastructure. The Jedburghs conducted operational level missions that supported the Allied invasion of France. Their tasks, often tactical in nature, were initially to disrupt the German's ability to reinforce the Normandy landing areas. Following the Allied breakout from the Normandy beachhead, the Jedburghs supported resistance forces that performed an economy of force role. Again, FM 100-25 identifies a role for special operations forces to: "play an economy of force role in secondary theaters of operations on the strategic

flanks or edge of the theater of war."¹² Few if any conventional Allied combat forces entered the southwestern area of France, which was considered a secondary area in the theater of operations and allocated to the FFI to liberate. In particular, the FFI liberated most of the area south of the Loire River, where all six Jedburgh teams operated. Consequently, the actions of the Jedburghs and their associated resistance forces served in an economy of force role, which was felt throughout the theater of war.

FM 31-20 states that there are five primary missions for Special Forces. They are: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. The Jedburghs conducted two of these five missions during their operations in France.

FM 31-20 defines unconventional warfare as:

...a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape (E&E).¹³

The Jedburghs conducted unconventional warfare even though they called it guerrilla warfare. The primary and common Jedburgh mission was to support, through training, equipping, organizing, and often directing, the French resistance forces against the Germans. The Jedburghs


received additional tasks to sabotage specific targets, such as telephone lines and rail stock. Through the FFI, the Jedburghs subverted members of the Premier Regiment De France to join the resistance and turn against the Germans.

Intelligence collection, although not a directed task, was a valuable byproduct of the Jedburghs operations. The teams identified enemy targets, such as troop convoys, and reported them to SFHQ for the Allied bombing efforts. Although the Jedburghs were not directed to establish evasion and escape networks in France, the teams assisted Allied personnel, particularly airmen, into the SOE established escape networks. In the case of team Andy, it took an American pilot with it when they left France.

Although not performed as readily as unconventional warfare, the Jedburghs conducted limited special reconnaissance missions. The reporting requirement of the Jedburghs to inform SFHQ of the status of the resistance forces and the convoy reporting done towards the end of their missions constituted special reconnaissance. In the case of reporting on the resistance forces, SFHQ had to know the capability of these resistance forces in order to advise SHAEF on the potential use of the resistance in support of the campaign plan. The FFI forces south of the Loire River performed an economy of force role for the U.S. Third Army. Prior to the FFI receiving this mission, SHAEF had to know what the FFI capability was. The Jedburghs reporting of

German convoys, units and headquarters, and aircraft locations for aerial bombardments, served the function of target acquisition. Based on the response from Allied aerial bombardment, which provided mixed results according to the teams, the command and control functions could have been better coordinated. Regardless, the Jedburghs performed special reconnaissance by fulfilling the target acquisition role.

I have told the story of six Jedburgh teams and evaluated their performance as to whether or not the teams were effective. I hope that readers of this paper will gain some insight into the role of special forces employed some 47 years ago. The Jedburghs were special forces that executed a nascent doctrine never before attempted on such a large scale. Today's Special Forces were born in the World War II Jedburgh project. A reader of special operations literature can identify lessons learned, both good and bad, from the stories of teams Hugh, Hamish, Ian, Andy, Ivor, and Alec, for under similar conditions; I believe the fundamentals of Jedburgh operations can be applied to today's Special Forces conducting unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance missions.



Map 8. Jedburgh's areas of operation

- | | | |
|---------|-----------|---------|
| 1. Hugh | 2. Hamish | 3. Ian |
| 4. Andy | 5. Ivor | 6. Alec |

CHAPTER EIGHT

ENDNOTES

¹ John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) 3: 1.

▪ Ibid., 1.

▪ Ibid., 74.

▪ Ibid., 296.

▪ Ibid., 321.

▪ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 463.

7 Ibid., 631, 661.

▪ Glyn Loosmore, Letter to author, 17 March 1991.

▪ Ibid.

¹⁰ Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 4: 672.

¹¹ U.S. Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, "FM 100-25 Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces", Final Draft, (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 1990), 2-3.

¹² Ibid., 2-6.

¹³ U.S. Army, FM 31-20, Doctrine For Special Forces Operations, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 1990), 3-1.

GLOSSARY

AS	<u>Armee Secrete</u>
Agent	Specially trained operative in enemy held territory to obtain information, organize resistance forces, and commit acts of sabotage.
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation. Used to transmit special messages to resistance forces and the Jedburghs in France.
<u>Boche</u>	French slang word for Germans
Bren	An automatic rifle uniquely identified by the magazine location above the receiver. The Bren fired a .303 caliber round at a cyclic rate of fire of 500 rounds per minuet from a 30 round magazine. Weight: 22 pounds, two ounces
Crystal	A critical part of wireless/telegraphy (W/T), which determined the frequency of transmission and reception.
D-Day	6 June 1944. The start date of operation OVERLORD - the invasion of France by the Western Allied armies.
Departments	Administrative divisions of France
DF	Special Executive Operations escape section
D/F	Direction finding. A means of locating radio frequency transmissions.
DMD	<u>Delegue Militaire Departmental</u> . The <u>Forces Francaises de l'Interieur</u> , FFI, military leader of a department.
DMR	<u>Delegue Militaire Regional</u> . The <u>Forces Francaises de l'Interieur</u> , FFI, designated military leader for a region.
DZ	Drop zone. The location designated for parachute drops, either personnel or equipment.

EMFFI	<u>Etat-major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur</u> . The General staff of the French Forces of the Interior. Commanded by General Koenig, who supported De Gaulle.
F	Special Executive Operations Independent French section (non-gaullist). Operated agents in France without regard to the agents political background. (Compare to RF)
FFI	<u>Forces Francaises de l'Interieur</u> . French forces of the interior. The organized resistance forces in France controlled by De Gaulle.
FTP	<u>Frances-tireurs et Partisans</u> . The military wing of the French Communist party. French sharpshooters and partisans, named after the French guerrilla heroes of 1870-1871.
Gestapo	<u>Geheime Staatspolizei</u> . German secret state police
Jedburgh	Code name for SOE/OSS mission which deployed specially trained three man teams to work with resistance forces in certain European countries.
Luftwaffe	The German air force
LZ	Landing zone
Maquis	Name given to the French resistance fighters. Also known as maquisards. This name derived from the area in southeastern France, where many young men sought refuge from the forced labor imposed by the Nazis.
<u>Milice</u>	Counterinsurgency forces for the French Vichy Government.
CG	Operational Groups. An American military unit made up of specially trained volunteers, consisting of four officers and 30 soldiers, controlled by SPHQ, and used to sabotage or conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.

OSS Office of Strategic Services. American secret operations and intelligence organization of World War II and forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

OVERLORD Code name given to the 6 June 1944 invasion of France by the Western Allied armies.

PTT Postes, Telegraphes, Telephones The French national communications agency.

RF Gaullist country section of Special Operations Executive for France. Operated pro-De Gaulle agents in France (Compare to F)

SAP Service d'atterrissages et parachutages

SAS Special Air Service. A British military unit made up of specially trained volunteers to conduct sabotage and raids behind enemy lines.

SFHQ Special Forces Headquarters. A Joint Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services special forces headquarters in SHAEF responsible for coordinating resistance activities.

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. The Allied headquarters in London.

SI Secret Intelligence branch of the OSS. Primary duties involved conducting espionage and secret collection of intelligence.

SO Special operations branch of the OSS. Primary duties involved sabotage and liaison with resistance movements.

SOF Special Operations Executive. The British special operations organization.

SOE/SO The joint headquarters of the British London branch of SOE and the American SO branch of the OSS. Controlled the Western Allied support to resistance movements in northwestern Europe. The controlling headquarters of the Jedburgh teams.

SOF	Special operations forces
Sten	British made submachine gun uniquely identified by its horizontal magazine mounted on the left side of the receiver. Fired a nine millimeter parabellum bullet from a 32 round magazine. This weapon could be disassembled into three, later models into two, parts and concealed in a suitcase.
V-1	<u>Vergeltungswaffe 1.</u> Reprisal weapon one, pilotless German rocket with a range of approximately 150 miles and a 2,000 pound warhead.
V-2	<u>Vergeltungswaffe 2.</u> Reprisal weapon two, ballistic missile. A German made rocket with a range of approximately 220 miles and a 2,000 pound warhead.
Wehrmacht	The German Armed Forces of World War II
W/T	Wireless telegraphy. The means of communication between SFHQ and Jedburgh teams in the field. More commonly called a radio.

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